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INTRODUCTION

On March 26, 2002, a class action complaint seeking reparations for slavery
was filed in the federal district court for the Eastern District of New York
under the name Farmer-Paellmanv. FleetBoston.1 The complaint named as

Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar, Boston University, knhylton@bu.edu. I
thank Jack Beermann, Alfred Brophy, Ron Cass, Hanoch Dagan, Adrienne Davis, David
Lyons, Allan Macurdy, Rusty Park, Tony Sebok, and Ken Simons for helpful discussions
and/or written comments. I also thank fellow conference participants - Richard Epstein,
Jim Hackney, Dennis Klimchuk, Andrew Kull, Saul Levmore, Kyle Logue, Emily Sherwin
- for insightful comments made in the course of the meeting that either led me to correct
mistakes in my thinking or avoid additional ones. I take responsibility for errors that remain
in this paper.
I Of course, I am referring to slavery in the American South, before its abolition in 1865.
The complaint alleged counts of conspiracy, human rights violations, conversion, and unjust
enrichment. See Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, Farmer-Paellman v. FleetBoston Fin.
Corp., No. 02-CV- 1862 (E.D.N.Y. filed March 26, 2002) [hereinafter Complaint], available
at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/slavery/fpllmnflt032602cmp.pdf (accessed Oct. 11,
2004). The complaint was later consolidated with other cases and dismissed in In re
African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. I11.2004), on
the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the case presented a non-justicable political
question, and the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint on April 5, 2004. See Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint
and Jury Demand, In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., MDL No. 1491 (N.D. I11.
filed Apr. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Amended Complaint] (alleging thirteen counts including
conspiracy, conversion, unjust enrichment, replevin, federal civil rights violations,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress and
violations of several state statutes governing "continued intentional misrepresentation").
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defendants FleetBoston Financial Corporation (a bank), Aetna (an insurance
company), CSX (a railroad) and a large number of unnamed corporations
described as "Corporate Does Numbers 1 - 1000."2 The complaint asked for
restitution, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and an accounting of the
3
profits earned by the predecessors of these firms from slavery.
The FleetBoston complaint transformed a long-discussed theoretical matter
into a living animal with the potential to bite someone. For up until the date of
the complaint, the reparations debate had been conducted largely among
friends and receptive audiences. Anyone who objected to the notion of paying
reparations for slavery could ignore the issue, and most people did just that.
One member of Congress, John Conyers, introduced a bill seeking slavery
reparations twelve years in a row, each time meeting a lopsided defeat and a
collective yawn from his colleagues. 4 The class action suit, though a long shot
from the start for the plaintiffs, represented a significant change in the terms of
the debate.
This paper evaluates the claim for slavery reparations from a torts
perspective. 5 I start with an examination of the injuries inflicted on slaves, and

Although this appears to be the first class action complaint seeking compensation for
slavery from American corporations, it is not the first complaint to seek reparations for
American slavery. See, e.g., Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that plaintiff lacked standing and that defendant United States enjoyed sovereign immunity);
Bell v. United States, No. 3:01-CV-0338-D, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14812 (N.D. Tex. July
10, 2001) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing and that defendant United States enjoyed
sovereign immunity); Jackson v. United States, No. C 94-01494 CW, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7872 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 1994) (holding that the statute of limitations barred claims
against the United States government); Obadele, v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 432 (2002)
(holding that African American plaintiffs' exclusion from Japanese internment reparations
did not violate equal protection). For United States court decisions on claims arising from
the Holocaust, see, for example, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J.
1999), which held that plaintiff's claims against German companies were time-barred, nonjusticiable, and would violate international comity, and Burger-Fischerv. Degussa AG, 65
F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999), which held that the adequacy of post-war reparations is a
political question beyond the court's jurisdiction. For an attempt to distinguish different
types of reparation claims, see Keith N. Hylton, A Framework for Reparations Claims, 24
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 31 (2004).
2 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 8-9.
1 Id.at 7.
4 See Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 17-18; Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone:
IsItTime to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REV.429, 433 (1998)
(explaining that Conyers began introducing bills in 1989 to establish a reparations study
commission, but each year they have stalled in committee).
I For earlier legal analyses of reparations claims based on American slavery, see BORIS I.
BiTrKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973), analyzing the constitutionality of

compensation; Anthony E. Cook, King and the Beloved Community: A Communitarian
Defense of Black Reparations, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 959 (2000), explaining how
reparations fit the vision of Martin Luther King, Jr. and offering a theoretical model, Irma
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Jacqueline Ozer, Reparationsfor African Americans, 41 How. L.J. 479 (1998), examining
reasons for reparation, legal basis and obstacles, Anthony J. Sebok, Reparations, Unjust
Enrichment, and the Importance of Knowing the Difference Between the Two, 58 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 651 (2003), examining unjust enrichment and the division of law and
equity in the context of slave litigation, Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An
Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597 (1993), analyzing the
reparations debate through history, including the Japanese internment compensation and the
Conyers bill, Westley, supra note 4, at 432-33, arguing that reparations should take center
stage as a "critical legalism" to avoid the pitfalls of affirmative action, Eric K. Yamamoto,
Racial Reparations:Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 40 B.C. L.
REV. 477 (1998) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Racial Reparations],examining redress for World
War II Japanese internment and its implications for African American and native
descendants, Tuneen E. Chisolm, Comment, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door:
Examining the Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
677 (1999), presenting the rationale for reparations, especially in light of the dismantling of
affirmative action, Rhonda V. Magee, Note, The Master's Tools, from the Bottom Up:
Responses to African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies
Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV. 863 (1993), discussing racial remedies theory, the role of the
courts, and refinements needed for better response to racial discrimination, and Note,
Bridging the Color Line: The Power of African American Reparations to Redirect
America's Future, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1689 (2002), examining reasons for reparations, legal
basis, and obstacles. For information on reparations for the Holocaust, see Libby Adler &
Peter Zumbansen, The Forgetfulness of the Noblesse: A Critique of the German Foundation
Law CompensatingSlave and ForcedLaborers of the Third Reich, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1
(2002), finding flaws in the compensation program established by German government and
industry, Michael J. Bazyler, Litigating the Holocaust, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 601 (1999),
explaining how claims have fared in the American legal system, Diane Richard Foos,
Righting Past Wrongs or Interfering with InternationalRelations? World War I1-Era Slave
Labor Victims Receive State Legal Standing After Fifty Years, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 221
(2000), examining California legislation to aid slave-labor victims in state court, and Darcie
L. Christopher, Note, Jus Cogens, Reparations Agreements, and Holocaust Slave Labor
Litigation, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1227 (2000), arguing that countries cannot bargain
away individual remedies because slave labor violates peremptory norms of international
law from which no derogation is permitted. For information on reparations to Japanese
Americans, see Shirley Castelnuovo, With Liberty and Justice for Some: The Case for
Compensation to Japanese Americans Imprisoned During World War II, in JAPANESE
AMERICANS: FROM RELOCATION TO REDRESS 203 (Roger Daniels et al. eds., Univ. of Wash.

Press rev. ed. 1991) (1986), examining compensation models, Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Reparationsfor Slavery and Other HistoricalInjustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
689, 721-23 (2003), examining an equal protection challenge to the Japanese internment
compensation program, Harry N. Scheiber, Taking Responsibility: Moral and Historical
Perspectives on the Japanese War-ReparationsIssues, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 233 (2002),
explaining how post-war treaties and alliances block compensation for victims of Japanese
slave labor and prisoner abuse in World War II, and Eric K. Yamamoto, Friend, or Foe or
Something Else: Social Meanings of Redress and Reparations, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 223 (1992), examining salutary and critical views of the U.S. compensation program.
For an application of public choice theory to slavery, Holocaust, and other types of
reparations, see Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L.
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the extent to which tort law provides a vehicle for redressing these injuries.
Next, I address the question of "derivative claims," claims brought by someone
other than the direct victim. This category of claims covers the reparations
complaint. As I will explain, tort law, for the most part, has not been receptive
to derivative claims. 6 Lastly, I discuss the accounting demand by the
reparations plaintiffs.
Tort doctrine appears to be inadequate as a means of converting the injuries
to slaves into claims for damages. 7 Slavery involves some obvious torts, such
as assault and battery, conversion, and wrongful confinement. A person held
as a slave today could surely collect damages. 8 Slavery also involves a
category of "social torts," however, that are equally if not more harmful, for
which tort law appears to be an inadequate means of seeking compensation.
Among these social torts are the slave marriage, the deprivation of status, and
the denial of religious freedom. Traditional tort doctrine does not have any
readily available "forms of action" for these injuries. And yet it is the social
torts that are potentially most damaging to slave descendants because, like a
constantly mutating virus, they have the capacity to injure successive
9
generations.
Of course, reparations claims are derivative in the sense that they are not
brought by direct victims, and thus the fact that a person held as a slave today
could collect damages does not tell us whether descendants of slaves should be
able to seek compensation through the tort system. The derivative status of
reparations claims presents special obstacles for plaintiffs. However, the fact
that slavery was entirely within the law when it was practiced should not be
viewed as a substantial obstacle. The slaveholder sought a regime in which the
law would not constrain him in his dealings with slaves. Applying today's law
to that relationship should be viewed as bringing law to a regime from which it
had been entirely displaced, not as a retroactive application of a different set of
rules.
The more troubling problem for plaintiffs is the passage of time.' 0 After
REV. 1657 (1999). For an excellent review of the literature and law on reparations, see
Alfred L. Brophy, Taking Reparations Seriously: Understanding Reparations for Slavery
and Jim Crow (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
6 See infra Part II.A. Modem reparations claims, as a special type of derivative tort
claim, have not fared well. See Brophy, supra note 5, 106-115 (providing a history of
modem reparations claims based on American slavery, recounting litigation up to the the
recent Farmer-Paelmmancase).
7 See Brophy, supra note 5, 106-115.
8 This is supported by the nineteenth century cases involving slaves who were awarded
damages for wrongful imprisonment. See Andrew Kull, Restitution in Favor of Former
Slaves, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1277, 1278-80 (explaining that although some plaintiffs chose to
waive a tort claim and sue for restitution rather than damages, the distinction between the
two remedies was blurred).
I See infra text accompanying notes 129-132.
10Richard Epstein reaches a similar conclusion in his contribution to this symposium.
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enough time has passed, tort doctrine shuts the door on compensation claims
based on old and distant injuries."1 The FleetBoston complaint and its progeny
are clearly vulnerable to this argument.
The only component of the new reparations claims that has the potential for
social gain is the demand for an accounting. 12 Information on slavery's
victims and how they were hurt has been readily available for a long time.
Information on slavery's beneficiaries and precisely how they profited should
also be in the public's hands, for it has the potential to clarify perceptions on
the social costs of slavery, bring about a more honest exchange on racial
issues, and reduce incentives to discriminate in the present. I would prefer to
see the scope of the demand expanded to include information not only on
profits from slavery, but also profits from the oppressive and discriminatory
regimes that appeared in its wake.
I.

TORTS OF SLAVERY

The first question that should be addressed is the precise tort claims that
descendants of slaves might have. Their claims are derivative of their
ancestors.
Thus, in order to understand the precise injury claims of
descendants, we must first understand the injury claims of ancestors. Let us
imagine, then, that a man or woman held as a slave were to bring a tort suit
against defendants involved in the slavery institution. What sort of claims
would the victim bring?
The harms inflicted upon African Americans in the period of slavery are so
well recorded that I could contribute little here beyond a mere listing of the
numerous references, perhaps beginning with Kenneth Stampp's The Peculiar
Institution.13 I will, instead, draw from a source that one hardly sees
mentioned in the treatments of slavery, Adam Smith, author of The Wealth of
Nations.14 Before Smith wrote The Wealth of Nations, he wrote another book,
really a set of lecture notes, entitled Lectures on Jurisprudence.15 In Lectures,
which should be regarded as the first comprehensive law and economics book

See Richard A. Epstein, The Case Against Black Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1183-

87 (2004) (arguing that the statute of limitations provides the strongest argument against
reparations).
" See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 (1979) (outlining the basics of
the statute of limitations doctrine).
12 See infra Part III.
13 KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM

SOUTH (1956) (offering a detailed account of African American life as a slave).
14 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

(Edwin Cannan ed., The Modem Library 1937) (1776).
15 ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (R.L. Meek et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press
1978) (1762-66) (compiling Smith's notes from his Moral Philosophy course at Glasgow
University).
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ever written, 16 we find a spellbinding description 18of the social costs of
slavery. 17 Smith takes a close look at Roman slavery.
Smith begins with a discussion of the "private costs" of slavery, which are
the costs bome by slaves. 19 These costs form the basis of a tort claim against a
slaveholder. Smith starts with the obvious cost: the slave's life, liberty, and
20
property were in the hands of his master.
His authority was not like that of a father over his children, which only
executed by the private will of the father the sentence which the laws of
the country would have given, but was altogether arbitrary; he might put a

16 Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence,written around 1762-66, is a fairly comprehensive

treatment of law, largely from an economic perspective. See id. The next such treatment
would not appear until Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, first published in 1972.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972) (weaving economic principles

into a survey of legal rules and institutions). Posner's book appeared roughly 210 years
after Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence,which gives one a sense of how far Smith was
ahead of his time. Before Smith's lectures, there were other discussions of law that
introduced many of the core approaches of law and economics, but these approaches
focused on specific parts of the law.

See, e.g., CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND

PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1963) (1764). Beccaria, writing around
the same time as Smith, took a utilitarian approach to criminal punishment. Id. Hume,
writing around 1740, also took an instrumentalist approach and laid important foundations
for the economics of property law. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 484-

501 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1978) (1739-40) (discussing norms and development of
property rights).
Hobbes, writing well before Smith in the 1670s, advanced an
instrumentalist approach to the law that put social welfare maximization as its primary goal,
although not in those exact words. See THOMAS HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A
PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND (Joseph Cropsey ed.,

Univ. of Chicago Press 1971) (1681) (employing a colloquy form to comment on English
law). After Smith, Bentham was arguably the key figure in the development of law and
economics. See POSNER, supra, at 357 ("Bentham's utilitarianism ...is another name for
economic theory."). Holmes, one hundred years after Bentham, used economic arguments
to explain large pieces of the common law. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW (Little, Brown & Co. 1990) (1881).
I' The reader may ask why I would rely on Adam Smith when there are other
spellbinding accounts of slavery, such as Stampp's, many of which have the benefit of
hindsight. I rely on Smith because of his tendency to generalize, model, and reduce
complex problems to essential components. This is clear in all of Smith's work, and is
probably the reason why The Wealth of Nations is considered by many to have launched
economics as an independent discipline. Smith's account of slavery in Lectures on
Jurisprudence reveals the same tendency to hone in on a basic theoretical architecture,
which one can examine from an infinite number of perspectives. A surprising number of
Stampp's observations on slavery are implied by Smith's generalizations.
18 SMITH, supra note 15, at 176-8 1.
19Id. (contrasting the slaves' "grievous" condition with conditions of family members of
the master).
20 Id.
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slave to death on the smallest transgression, or the
slightest neglect of his
2
commands, and no fault was to be found in him. '
We see at once that whether we are talking about Roman slavery or
American slavery, it is a regime in which slave and master have a special
relationship under the law unlike that of any other legal relationship. The slave
is completely subject to the will of the master.22 The slave could be killed,
beaten, raped, or overworked without any threat of state intervention. 23 The
slave's property belonged to the master, at least as far as the law was
concerned, so the master could deprive the slave of his savings whenever it
24
suited him.
Smith's first words on the master-slave relationship go to the core of the
institution. What is truly special about slavery is the absence of government
regulation. Indeed, slavery can be defined as the absence of the threat of the
government intervening to regulate a relationship between any two individuals.
Some might call this freedom. But we see in the case of slavery a perversion
of the concept of freedom, an example of what Popper described as the
paradox of freedom. 25 The absence of the threat of government intervention
means that the stronger party enslaves the weaker party. This denies freedom
to the weaker party.
The "paradox of freedom" involves a tradeoff in which the weaker party
loses its freedom while the stronger party's freedom grows, so that absolute
freedom results in the greater mass losing its freedom. 26 The case of slavery
provides an interesting and disturbing version. For as Smith makes clear in his
treatment, and as I hope to make clear in this discussion, the institution of
slavery leads to a reduction in the freedom of both parties. 27 The institution

21

Id. at 176.

22 Id. (describing the master's power over the slave as "absolute and arbitrary").
23 As Stampp notes, there were some legal constraints on slaveholders in the South. See
STAMPP, supra note 13, at 217-20 (describing how all southern states adopted laws to
prevent abuse of slaves). These constraints, however, put few obstacles in the way of most
slaveholders. Id. at 222-24 (explaining how the codes were qualified so that masters, in
many circumstances, could escape punishment for the death of a slave); see also STANLEY
M. ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE 56-

58 (Universal Library ed. 1963) (1959) (providing an example of the light sentence given to
a master who tortured a slave to death). For a detailed presentation of the legal constraints
on slaveholders, see THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW., 1619-1860, at

161-208 (1996).

supra note 15, at 177.
25 2 KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 44 (5th ed. 1966) (arguing
24 SMITH,

that "unlimited freedom leads to the opposite").
26 Id.

27 See SMITH, supra note

15, at 181-82 (commenting that slave masters exerted
tremendous efforts maintaining control over slaves and were in constant fear of
insurrection).
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shows the classic features of the Prisoner's Dilemma,2 8 though in sequential
form. The first party's move, the enslaver, sets off a chain of events that leave
both slave and master in an inferior welfare position relative to where they
would be in the absence of slavery.
There is another sense in which slavery is unique, special, or in Stampp's
words, "peculiar. ' 29 The paradox of freedom problem has the simple Kantian
solution: Each individual should have as much freedom as is compatible with a
like freedom on the part of others. 30 To be sure, this is a vague formula that
doesn't take us far in solving real problems. However, it appears to be right,
and one might say this formula is the moral starting point for law, insofar as it
attempts to regulate the relationship between two individuals. And in the end,
all law aims to regulate the relationships among individuals. Even when it
seems to be regulating the relationship between an individual and an inanimate
object, like a rock, it does so only to prevent harm to another individual.
The Kantian formula's practical message is incomprehensible as applied to
the institution of slavery. There is no golden mean, no point at which the
slaveholder's freedom is in some morally acceptable balance with the slave's.
We stare at slavery, and we see a moral vacuum. Stampp tells us that the
Southern legislatures and the courts pretended here and there to fill this empty
space with constraints, but these efforts, if they were serious at all, proved
futile. 31 Laws ostensibly designed to constrain the slaveholder were
insufficient in practice to be effective because they were overwhelmed by other
procedural and substantive rules designed to give leeway for the slaveholder's
32
whim to control.

Given the nature of this relationship, one would expect life for the slave to
28

See R. DUNCAN

LUCE

&

HowARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND

CRITICAL SURVEY 95 (1957) (presenting scenarios in which two criminal co-defendants
could: 1) refuse to confess and serve lighter sentences on a lesser charge; 2) both confess
and receive a lighter recommended sentence on the target offense; or 3) risk that one
prisoner could receive the lightest punishment by confessing, while his co-defendant would
get maximum punishment).
29 Stampp explains that Southerners used the term "peculiar institution" to describe
slavery. STAMPP, supra note 13, at 3.
30 See POPPER, supra note 25, at 44 (crediting Kant with solving the paradox of freedom).
31 STAMPP, supra note 13, at 219-24.
32 Id. at 222-24. In particular, the most important protection was the inability of slaves to
initiate a legal proceeding or to testify against a white person in court. Id. at 222. Frederick
Douglass identified the legal barriers to slaves as one of the main reasons violence could be
used as a tool of control on slave farms. See FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE
OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN AMERICAN SLAVE, WRITTEN BY HIMSELF 52 (David W.

Blight, ed., The Bedford Series in History and Culture 1993) ("Mr. Gore's... horrid crime
was not even submitted to judicial investigation. It was committed in the presence of slaves,
and they of course could neither institute a suit, nor testify against him; and thus the guilty
perpetrator of one of the bloodiest and most foul murders goes unwhipped of justice, and
uncensored by the community in which he lives.").
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be one long continuous tort. The relationship is bursting with an infinite
number of potential torts. In spite of this, almost all of the torts can be grouped
into a few broad legal categories: assault and battery, conversion, and false
imprisonment. I have left out wrongful death and negligence. Wrongful death
is a claim that might be brought by the relative of a slave for the loss of
financial support, though it runs into the problem that the slave was entirely
under the care of the master; the slave was not a direct source of income or
support for any of his family members. 33 Negligence might be brought for
carelessly overworking a slave, but this claim is superseded by the intentional
torts that come well before it, such as wrongful imprisonment. Under the
standard negligence doctrine, the defendant is held liable for all injuries,
foreseeable or not, connected to the confinement. 34 Because overworking a
slave is an injury connected to the initial decision to confine the slave without
a legal right, there is no need to bring a negligence claim.
But hold on, says the slaveholder, the term "legal right" (which I just
mentioned) has to be brought into this discussion a little more. Before the
35
Thirteenth Amendment, slavery was entirely legal in the southern states.
Moreover, the "slave codes" explicitly authorized the treatment most
slaveholders gave to their slaves. 36 The slaveholders complied with the law
existing at the time. In view of this, the slaveholder would argue that he
breached no legal duties and lawsuits brought by former slaves should be
dismissed. After all, it is understood that under tort doctrine, you must find
that the potential defendant breached a legal duty before you can hold that
37
person liable for damages.
How about that? Should courts simply dismiss reparations lawsuits on the
ground that the claims are derivative of a group of victims who themselves
would have had no right to sue for their injuries? One response, already
incorporated in the complaint filed by reparations plaintiffs, is that this is a suit
for restitution, based on a theory of unjust enrichment. 38 But this does not
easily evade the slaveholder's objection because the harms for which
reparations plaintiffs have brought suit were entirely within and sanctioned by
the law when they occurred. The slaveholders did not, in bad faith, violate or
take advantage of a gap in the law or someone else's mistake - features that

supra note 15, at 177.
See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 11, at 42-43 (4th ed.
1971) (describing similarities to trespass doctrine).
35 On the progression of the law toward the abolition of slavery and the Thirteenth
Amendment, see HAROLD W. HOROWITZ & KENNETH L. KARST, LAW, LAWYERS AND
33 SMITH,
34

SOCIAL CHANGE:

CASES

AND MATERIALS

ON THE ABOLITION

OF SLAVERY,

SEGREGATION AND INEQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 41-109 (1969).
36 See STAMPP, supra note 13, at 196-236 (discussing slave codes).

" See PROSSER, supra note 34, § 11.
38 See Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 60.
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appear to be common in restitution claims. 39 Another response is to point to
the fact that some slaveholders did violate the laws of their time. 40 Some
slaveholders violated bans on slave trading, or murdered slaves in violation of
laws on the books.4 1 These cases circumvent the problem of legal approval,
but they probably amount to a few tiny drops within a vast sea of cruelties. I
doubt there are enough of these cases to support a class action lawsuit.
There is no getting around the fact that any attempt to apply tort law to
slavery means applying today's law to an institution that existed within the law
a century and half ago. When one focuses exclusively on the specific torts of
slavery, this is not a morally troubling outcome. It is troubling, however,
viewed generally. Applying today's law to events that happened within the
law yesterday opens up a messy can of worms, to say the least. And once
courts side with plaintiffs and open up that can,. it is not easy to see why the
42
plaintiffs approach should be confined to slavery lawsuits.
I think there is a limiting principle for an exception in the case of slavery
that would permit us to apply today's tort law to the institution. The limiting
principle is suggested by the special legal status that the institution claimed for
itself. We have to reject the notion that anything we would wish to call law
would ever sanction such an institution. For the institution is founded on the
absence of law.43 The institution itself claims to be one that has struck a deal
31 See Andrew Kull, Defenses to Restitution: The Bona Fide Creditor, 81 B.U. L. Rev.

919, 955 (2001) (describing restitution as a body of law that decides when "involuntary
transfer should be given legal effect").
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 5 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
40 See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing Rhode Island businessman John

Brown, who was prosecuted for violating federal law by participating in the slave trade after
it had become illegal).
41 See id.

42 For theoretical justifications of retroactive law application in the slavery context, see
Hanoch Dagan, Restitution and Slavery: On Incomplete Commodification, Intergenerational

Justice, and Legal Transitions, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1139, 1158-64 (2004). Dagan draws partly
on economic theories presented by Louis Kaplow and, more recently, Kyle Logue. See
Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REv. 509, 513-514,
615-617 (1986) (addressing whether and how government transition policies should mitigate
investors' gains and losses caused by reform); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions,
Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L.
REv. 1129, 1131 (1996) (arguing that certain tax reforms should be accompanied by

transition relief in the form of grandfather treatment). The argument coming from these
works is, roughly, that a flat prohibition of retroactive application is itself inefficient, and
that law should be retroactively applied where the threat of such application encourages
socially desirable incentives, such as the incentive to invest in productive resources. See
Kaplow, supra, at 615 (arguing that investors should be influenced by the possibility of
future reform). These arguments are difficult to object to, stated in these terms. However,
one major problem is articulating a limiting principle for retroactive application. I have
attempted to do that here.
41 One contemporary summary of the laws of slavery notes that one southern court came
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in which the state agrees to stay out, and let the slaveholder define the law that
44
governs his relationship with the slave.
It is entirely reasonable for the state to say that it never cut such a deal with
anyone or any institution. As Smith noted, no other institution or relationship
has ever claimed to have such a perpetual status under the law.45 The family is
not exempt from regulation and has not been viewed as exempt since the
earliest period of Roman law.46 No corporation was ever held to have such a
relationship with its customers or employees. 47 English common law,
according to Blackstone, rejects any claim of an enforceable contract in which
48
one party relinquishes all of his legal rights to another.
Slavery should be treated not as an institution sanctioned by the law, but as a
corruption or displacement of law. Law and slavery are, in essence, "universal
complements," in the sense that one can exist only in a space in which the
other is absent. Hence, the only morally consistent position that a state can
take with respect to slavery is that it has never cohabited with the institution.
Moreover, this position works as a limiting principle on legal revisionism
because slavery is the only institution that claims to have had such a
relationship with the state.
The correct model for slavery-based lawsuits is therefore not one of a
change from a loose regulatory regime to a stricter one. This view would tend
to support arguments against retroactive application of modem law. The
appropriate model is one in which warlords have displaced the state and held it
at bay while they imposed their own law on their subjected populations. When

close to saying this: "The doctrine of South Carolinais equally strong. It is concentrated by
Wardlaw, J., in this single sentence: - 'Every endeavor to extend to a slave positive rights is
an attempt to reconcile inherent contradictions;for, in the very natureof things, he is subject
to DESPOTISM.'" GEORGE M. STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN
THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 10 (Negro Univs. Press 1968)
(1856) (alterations in original) (citing Ex parte Boyleton, 2 Strobhart,41).
4 See supranotes 23-25 and accompanying text.
41 See SMITH, supra note 15, at 176.
46 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 440-42
(discussing evolution of legal constraints in parent-child relationship from Roman to
English law). Blackstone notes that "[tjhe ancient Roman laws gave the father a power of
life and death over his children; upon this principle, that he who gave had also the power of
taking away.... The power of a parent by our English laws is much more moderate ...
Id. at 440.
41 Perhaps the closest the law has come toward recognizing such a relationship is found
in assumption of risk doctrine. See PROSSER, supra note 34, § 68. Assumption of risk
doctrine, however, has been construed narrowly, requiring a close fit between the implied
consent and the victim's knowledge of the risk he faced before injury. See id. at 447.
Assumption of risk doctrine has never given corporations a legal ground to claim a general
immunity from legal claims by employees or customers.
48 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at 412 (discussing non-enforcement of contract for
slavery); id. at 410-20 (discussing the employment relationship generally).
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the state becomes strong enough to displace the warlords, it has no moral duty
to respect the warlord's law.
In addition to the argument that slavery was well within the law, the
slaveholder could also assert that the institution was not as harmful as many
have claimed. Smith's description of Roman slavery certainly gives one the
impression that slaves were commonly abused. 49 He offers no statistics on
abuse, just a few striking examples.
We are told that Augustus once manumitted all of the slaves of V[edius]
Pollio with whom he supped. A slave bringing in a dish happened to
break it. The slave fell at Augustus feet and requested him, not to get his
pardon of his master, for death he thought was inevitable, but that he
would request his master that after he was crucified, which was the
common punishment inflicted on slaves, he should not hack his body into
pieces and throw it to feed the fish in his ponds, which was it seems his
common way of treating them. 50
Smith further explains:
Nothing was more common then to turn out the old or diseased slaves to
die, as we would a dying horse. Cato, who was a man of the most severe
virtue and the strictest observer of morall rules then in fashion, used
frequently to do this and confessed it without any shame; and this he
would not have done if it had been contrary to the practise of the times.
In the same man<n>er as it is common near a great city to have a place
where they put dying cattle, so there was an island in the Tiber into which
they used to turn the slaves who were about to dye, and we are told it was
5
white all over with their bones. '
The treatment was apparently not as bad for slaves in the South. 52 Stampp
recounts many stories of cruelty, but none as disturbing as these pieces from
Smith.
The American slaveholders' defense to these charges is that the institution
was not as cruel as Smith's description would lead one to believe. Some
slaveholders would take the position that the institution was not cruel at all,
53
brandishing copies of Fogel and Engerman's Time on the Cross as support.

49 SMITH,

supra note 15, at 177.

50Id.
Id.at 181.
I1
52 Even Frederick Douglass's autobiography, which is filled with stories of cruelty, does

not include any account as bad as the "dish story" told by Smith. See DOUGLASS, supra note
32. Douglass does say, however, that his grandmother was essentially turned out to die. Id.
at 65-66 ("[T]hey took her to the woods, built her a little hut, put up a little mud-chimney,
and then made her welcome to the privilege of supporting herself in perfect loneliness; thus
virtually turning her out to die!").
53 ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE
ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1974).
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The Fogel and Engerman book uses statistics to paint an idyllic picture of the
institution.5 4 If Fogel and Engerman are correct, slavery's victims would be
unable to prove that they suffered substantial damages.
Fogel and Engerman treat slavery as an economically efficient institution. 55
Sure, they say, slaves were whipped, beaten, and overworked, but so were free
laborers. 56 The central issue, in their view, is whether slaveholders applied an
economically inefficient level of abuse to their slaves. Because the slaves were
valuable property to the slaveholders, 57 the optimal amount of force is not the
amount that would have left slaves near death from exhaustion, or unable to
work into their middle ages. 58 The optimal policy would aim to maximize the
value of the slave's work over his life. Force might be necessary in this
regime, but it would be used to the point at which its marginal benefit is just
equal to its marginal cost. Fogel and Engerman conclude that the evidence is
closer to the efficiency theory. 59 In perhaps the most significant challenge to
the economic critics of slavery, Fogel and Engerman argue that the institution
was more efficient, by a margin of roughly one third, than farms worked by
60
free labor.
There have'been attempts to challenge the statistical evidence on abuse used
by Fogel and Engerman. 61 I am not aware of any consensus view on the
14 By presenting an optimistic and romanticized picture of slavery, Fogel and Engerman
can be viewed as returning to the starting point of American historical scholarship on

slavery, which is represented by ULRICH BONNELL PHILLIPS, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY: A
SURVEY OF THE SUPPLY, EMPLOYMENT AND CONTROL OF NEGRO LABOR AS DETERMINED BY

THE PLANTATION REGIME (1918). Phillips's account was based on two fundamental notions:

"idyllism," or the description of slavery as a gentle, developmental regime; and racism, or
the description of slavery as being consistent with or appropriate given an assumed
inferiority of African Americans. See id. at 291-343 (describing plantations as "schools" in
the slaves' "transition from barbarism to civilization"). Much of the modem slavery
scholarship attacks both premises. Though Fogel and Engerman differ from the modem
scholarship by seeming to support the idyllic representation, they emphatically reject
Phillips's view of the character of African American slaves. See FOGEL & ENGERMAN,
supra note 53, at 223-32 (rejecting theories of innate inferiority as an explanation or
justification of slavery).
55 See FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supra note 53, at 147.
56 Id. at 146 (describing whipping as a common punishment for criminals and honest
people who somehow shirked their duties, and commenting that early scripture encouraged
the whipping of disobedient wives).
51 Id. at 73-75 (calculating that slaves had positive average net income from age eight to
their late seventies).
51 Id. at 144-50.
19 Id. (arguing that to attribute whipping to maliciousness of masters is "naive," and
planters instead wanted slaves "who identified their fortunes with the fortunes of their
masters").

60 Id. at 191-209.
61 See, e.g., PAUL A. DAVID ET AL., RECKONING WITH SLAVERY: A CRITICAL STUDY IN

THE QUANTITATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 339-57 (1976) (concluding that
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statistical evidence; it appears to remain a controversy, perhaps one that will
never be resolved. Stampp, in important respects, fully anticipated Fogel and
Engerman's arguments. He was keen to note in his description of abuses that
they were not the primary method of managing slaves. 62 Stampp explained
that slaveholders had incentives to manage their property carefully and to make
the most productive use of it. 63 Still, in Stampp's view, this offered no basis
for excusing or downplaying the torts that did occur.64
Smith also anticipated Fogel and Engerman's arguments. He explained that
the frequency of abuse depended on the nature of the slavery regime. 65 Where
slaves were a small proportion of the population, and the owners were
relatively modest in wealth, they would be treated moderately according to
Smith. 66 The reason for this is that the slaves would tend to work and live
closely with the owner under these conditions, and a relationship of reciprocity
would develop over time. 67 Where slaves are numerous as a proportion of the
population, Smith observed, things were different. 68 The slaveholders would
Time on the Cross is "shot through" with errors);

HERBERT G. GUTMAN, SLAVERY AND THE

(1975). Gutman desribed Time on the
Cross as a "thoroughly inadequate model of slave socialization" and "poor social history."
Id. at 2.
62STAMPP, supra note 13, at 178 (asserting that the "great majority" of slaveholders used
as "little violence as possible").
63 Id. at 179, 279-80 (explaining that the high price of slaves partially restrained cruelty).
6' Id. at 180 (depicting the treatment of slaves as possessing an "element of savagery").
NUMBERS GAME: A CRITIQUE OF TIME ON THE CROSS

65 SMITH, supra note 15, at 182-86.
66 Id. at 184.

67 Id. at 182-83. Stampp's discussion of small farms, and the need for farm owners to
pitch in with hard work, is consistent with Smith's generalization. See STAMPP, supra note
13, at 35.
68 SMITH, supra note 15, at 185. Smith appears to have a simple model of the incentives
governing the treatment of slaves. Under his model, cruelty is largely a function of the
wealth disparity between the top and bottom classes, or, equivalently, the size of slave
farms. Although Smith uses the model effectively to explain the differences in cruelty
levels across slave regimes, see id. at 184-85, it appears to be too simple in retrospect. In
particular, Smith's model leaves out one very important factor in explaining the treatment of
slaves: the degree to which slaves are integrated within the general labor market. Full
integration means that slaves can gain or purchase their freedom relatively easily, and even
the purchase and sale of slaves should be considered as evidence of some integration
(though to a small degree). Peter Temin argues that slaves in ancient Rome were highly
integrated within the general labor market, especially those living in cities. PETER TEMIN,
THE LABOR SUPPLY OF THE EARLY ROMAN EMPIRE 2 (Mass. Inst. Tech. Dep't of Econ.,

Working
Paper
No.
01-46,
2001),
available
at
http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf~abstractid=293397 (accessed Oct. 10, 2004). Temin
argues that the high degree of integration, coupled with the greater prospect of attaining
freedom, made early Roman slavery a relatively mild regime in comparison to American
slavery. Id. at 10-19. If Temin is limiting himself to early Rome (which he never makes
clear in the paper), then it is easy to reconcile his explanation with Smith's description,
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be in constant fear of insurrection and would need the threat of violent force to
70
control this risk.69 This would make abuse a common feature of the system.
Moreover, the fact that slaveholders had economic incentives to maximize the
value of their property would not give us any reason to believe that the use of
force was in any sense moderate. Where the threat of insurrection was high,
the threat of violent force, verified by its frequent application, would have to
be correspondingly high.
If one reconciles these arguments to create a statistical picture of the torts
connected to slavery, one would presume that the violent use of force was
concentrated in the time periods and areas in which large slave farms were
common. In the American South, the period and area in which large farms
were common was the "Deep South" (roughly, around Georgia) during the
half-century before abolition. 7' Very large farms, an order of magnitude larger
than those of the American South, were common in the British and French
Caribbean, although these farms produced sugar rather than cotton and began
in an earlier time period. 72 Slaves coming from these areas, in certain time
periods, should be presumed to have suffered from physical violence. If Fogel

since Smith focuses on slavery in the Roman countryside during the empire's later period.
If one were to describe a general model of cruelty in slave regimes, it would be depend on
two variables: (1) the disparity in wealth between slaves and owners and (2) the degree to
which slaves are integrated in the general labor market. African American slaves, in
comparison to Roman slaves living in cities, were not well integrated. The lowest level of
integration is observed in the Nazi concentration camps and the Soviet gulag system. See
id. at 17.
69 See SMITH, supra note 15, at 182-83 (presenting the West Indian sugar islands as an
example of when fear of slave insurrection leads to severe treatment).
70 I should include within this description of abuse a startling type of systemic neglect
that appeared as a byproduct of the large farm systems. observed in ancient Rome and in the
sugar-producing Caribbean colonies. Under both systems, slaves were brought over to do
heavy labor, which led to a demand primarily for male slaves. See id. at 193. The small
proportion of female slaves made it impossible for these slave populations to reproduce on
their own, and also led to family instability and child neglect. See id. Since it was costly to
raise a worker rather than grab one full grown, the slaveholders had no incentive to
accommodate or support slave families. New slaves were introduced by continually
imprisoning a steady flow of male laborers from other countries. See id. (describing an
island near Rome where accounts showed more than 10,000 slaves on the market). Smith's
observations are confirmed by Fogel and Engerman's comparison of the natural growth (i.e.,
excluding imports) of slave populations in America and in the Caribbean. See FOGEL &
ENGERMAN, supra note 53, at 25-26. While the birthrate exceeded the death rate for slaves
in the South, the incumbent population of slaves declined by 2 to 5 percent per year in the
Caribbean. Id.
71 See FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supra note 53, at 44 (explaining that the slave populations
shifted heavily towards areas engaged in cotton production); STAMPP, supra note 13, at 31
(explaining that large slaveholdings were much more common in the Deep South).
72 See FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supra note 53, at 22 (describing how the market for sugar
production produced large farms with many slaves).
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and Engerman are right, such a presumption is not appropriate for slaves held
in other time periods or places in America. 73 As far as conversion claims go,
of course, all slaves should be presumed to have been victims. The same is
true for claims based on false imprisonment.
Debates over the physical abusiveness of slavery, though important in
determining whether slaves should be allowed to base their tort claims on such
abuses, are probably beside the point in any overall assessment of tort claims
arising from slavery or of the institution itself. Behind every cooperative
relationship is a threat on the part of one party to impose a sanction on the
other for refusing to comply with relational norms. 74 The extent of cooperation
depends in large part on the severity of the sanction and its likelihood of being
imposed. The law puts heavy restraints on the sanctions an individual can
impose on his neighbor for breaching norms of conduct. The law puts no such
restraints on the slaveholder.
If the slaveholder seldom beat his slaves, what are we to make of this? Does
it tell us, as Fogel and Engerman would have us believe, that the institution
was not a brutal one? Or does it tell us that because of the threat of
unregulated violence, the slave held his head down and did what he was told to
do, no matter how disagreeable? Evidence of actual physical abusiveness
simply does not tell us much about the validity of tort claims based on slavery
or about the real abusiveness of the institution. Evidence suggesting that
whippings were infrequent is consistent with the claim that the institution was
not physically abusive and equally consistent with the claim that the sanctions
were so severe that slaves generally did not refuse masters. And if slaves did
not refuse their masters because they feared punishment, then all that the
evidence tells us is that they chose to be relatively unhappy many times rather
than extremely unhappy a small number of times.
Smith noted that in addition to the obvious harms - physical injury, loss of
property, and loss of liberty - the slave also suffered less obvious, subtle
injuries, many of which would appear to be actionable under tort doctrine.
This second group of injuries might be labeled "social torts" in recognition of
their affinity to what Orlando Patterson described as the slave's "social
death."' 75 The most obvious of these is the inability to marry or to have a
conventional marriage as most of us understand it today. In this respect the
status of American slaves is no different from that of Roman slaves, which
73Stanley Elkins's discussion of slavery suggests a different view. See ELKINS, supra
note 23, at 63-78. Elkins argues that American slavery was unique in comparison to
contemporary slave regimes (e.g., Brazil) in its degree of social and legal isolation of slaves,
and its presumption of permanence. Id.
74 See HOLMES,

supra note 16, at 44.

71 ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1982).

Patterson describes "social death" as the reality that "[i]f the slave no longer belonged to a
community, if he had no social existence outside of his master, then what was he? The
initial response in almost all slaveholding societies was to define the slave as a socially dead
person." Id. at 38.
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Smith described as follows:
We are told that the male and female slaves lived together in
contubemium, which is generally supposed to denote the same thing with
regard to the slaves as matrimonium with regard to free persons. But <it>
is very plain that there must have been a great difference. For no union
betwixt them could have been of a long continuance from the very nature
of their condition. First of all, that which creates the obligation to-fidelity
in the wife was altogether wanting when a male and female slave
cohabited together. When a man takes a wife she comes to be altogether
under his protection; she owes her safety and maintenance (especially in
the lower ranks) intirely to her husband, and from this dependance it is
that she is thought to be bound to be faithfull and constant to him. But a
female slave who cohabits with the male one has no such obligation; she
is not maintaind by his labour, nor defended by him, nor any way
supported; all this, as far as she enjoys it, she has from her master ....
For this reason we see that the corrupting a female slave who lived in
contubernio with a male one was not looked on as any way reprehensible
or injurious. It was no injury to the master, nor was it any to the slave as
he had no claim to her fidelity.... Many other things render their
cohabitation precarious.
The duration of it does not depend on
themselves but on their master. If he thinks that they do not labour so
well together, he may send <them> to different parts of his farm, or he
76
may sell either of them at his pleasure.
Stampp's description of American slavery gives us no reason to think that
slaves in the South had any more freedom with regards to marriage. 77 Fogel
and Engerman, on this and many other issues, are keen to note that the
slaveholder had incentives to keep slaves reasonably happy in order to
maintain their productivity as workers. 78 They do not dwell on slave
marriages, but the implications of their arguments are clear. A slaveholder
should, in their view, regulate marriage-related disputes in order to bring order
to relationships that were not recognized by law. Slaveholders should have
had incentives to discourage infidelity and prostitution, and to recognize
spousal and parental rights and responsibilities, to the extent they did not
interfere with their own management rights. These are plausible arguments,
though in each case the practice would depend on the views of the slaveholder
76 SMITH, supra note 15, at 178-79.

77 STAMPP, supra note 13, at 340-49 (describing how slave marriages had no legal
recognition and were governed by the master). Even Smith's remark that the corrupting of a
female slave was not looked on as injurious, see SMITH, supra note 15, at 178, remained the
law over the nearly two millennium stretch. Stampp notes that in Mississippi, the Supreme
Court once dismissed an indictment brought against a male slave for raping a female slave
on the ground that it was not an offense known to common or statute law. See STAMPP,
supra note 13, at 347.
78 FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supra note 53, at 128.
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and his capacity to regulate marriage-like relationships. Even the most
thoughtful slaveholder might find it too taxing to regulate the sex lives of
slaves; and the central problem is that the institution hollows out the legal and
material incentives that give stability to marriages, replacing them with the
managerial hand of the slaveholder. Put another way, the institution strips
property-like rights out of the marriage institution and replaces them with the
cost-benefit calculus of the slaveholder.
The same observations apply to the relationship between parents and
children. Stampp suggests, as do Fogel and Engerman, that the separation of
mothers from young children was relatively rare, 79 but that separation of
fathers from children was not such a rare occurrence. As Fogel and Engerman
note, the slaveholder's profit incentive would prevent him from being eager to
sell off fathers who had small children, as this would hurt morale.80
Nonetheless, male slaves were often separated from their families for reasons
the slaveholder could not control - for example, to pay off a debt.8 ' While
there are no statistics on the frequency of such separations, they occurred
frequently enough to become a major spur to the abolitionists and a sufficient
reason for many to see an end to the institution. The story of the male slave
sold away from his family was an important part of the appeal of Uncle Tom's
Cabin8 2 and of one of the most popular American songs of all time, Steven
Foster's My Old Kentucky Home. The first verse of Foster's song is a concise
83
and moving story of the breakup.
The sun shines bright in the old Kentucky home,
'Tis summer, the darkies are gay,
The corn top's ripe and the meadow's in the bloom,
79 See id. at 49-50 (presenting evidence of a relatively low number of child sales).

Stampp takes no clear position on the relative frequency with which mothers were separated
from children (in comparison to fathers), but notes that it was common for mother and
children to be considered a family unit without reference to the father. See STAMPP, supra
note 13, at 344.
80 FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supra note 53, at 127-29.
8" STAMPP, supra note 13, at 199-200 (describing the procedures for disposing of estates
and settling debts in relation to slave ownership).
82 See HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE ToM's CABIN (1852).

8' "My Old Kentucky Home," in a sanitized version. is both the state song of Kentucky
and sung at the opening every year of the Kentucky Derby horse race. See Kentucky
Department for Libraries and Archives, Kentucky's State Song: "My Old Kentucky Home, "
at http://www.kdla.ky.gov/resources/KYSong.htm (accessed Oct. 11, 2004). Most of those
who sing it today have not the slightest idea that it is about the breakup of a slave family.
Most probably think that it has something to do with the Kentucky Derby, or with a worker
having to leave Kentucky to take a job somewhere else. The music itself has a beautiful
sadness to it that would lead one to think that it must be about something sad. But the
connection to slavery, and lyrics describing quiet acquiescence in an oppressive regime, are
lost on most who hear the song today. A cynic might describe the adoptions of the sanitized
version as conspiratorial efforts to impose a collective amnesia.
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While the birds make music all the day;
The young folks roll on the little cabin floor,
All merry, all happy, and bright,
By'n by Hard Times comes a-knocking at 84
the door,
Then my old Kentucky home, good night!
Thus, the slave marriage was always precarious and uncertain. The male
slave's relationship with his own children was just as precarious. The stability
of these relationships depended on the cost-benefit calculus of the slaveholder.
Smith suggests that the same material incentives that held marriages together
were also important in the relationship between father and child. "Tho he be
satisfied that they were begotten by him, he knows too that they were not
supported nor maintained by him, nor any way protected, which as I said
before is that which alone constitutes the parentall and filial affections. '85 The
children would soon learn that they were neither maintained nor protected by
their father or mother: Stampp provides the example of a child on a Louisiana
farm who "saw his mother receive twenty-five lashes for countermanding an
'86
order his mistress had given him.
The destruction of property-like expectations or, equivalently, the
socialization of the slave marriage is predictably a recipe for disaster. The
relatively low probability that the family unit would remain intact should have
weakened incentives to invest in the marriage relationship - i.e., to forgo some
immediate gain today in order to preserve the relationship - or to invest in
children by taking responsibility for their education and moral development.
Smith claimed that as a result, prostitution was common among female Roman
slaves and in his day was a common feature of slavery in the West Indian
colonies. 87 Stampp describes sexual promiscuity and neglect of children as
serious problems under slavery in the South. 88 Fogel and Engerman try to
counter these claims, but fail to provide the same detailed statistical evidence
characteristic of their approach to other controversial issues. 89 The lack of
good statistical evidence makes it hard to determine the extent of the family
instability problem, and probably few useful data sources, if any, exist. Some
scholars, however, have claimed that the much-discussed weakness of the
African American family unit, identified as a reason for alarm in the 1960s by
84 For the full original version of the lyrics, see STEPHEN COLLINS FOSTER, MY OLD

KENTUCKY HOME, at http://www.ket.org!underground/resources/oldkyhome.htm

(accessed
Oct. 10, 2004). The phrase "the darkies are gay" now reads "the people are gay." Id.
5 SMITH, supra note 15, at 179.
86 STAMPP, supra note 13, at 343.
87 SMITH, supra note 15, at 179

(asserting that female slaves will always engage in

prostitution).
88 STAMPP, supra note 13, at 345-48 (discussing how it was common for a slave woman
to have numerous children with different fathers, and the indifference with which children
were often regarded).

89 FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supra note 53, at 135-38.
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the Moynihan Report, 90 can be traced to incentives created under slavery. 9 1
In addition to the socialization of marriage, another significant social tort
inflicted on slaves was the denial of religious freedom - or, as Smith says, the
denial to the slaves of their own god. 92 Just as Roman slaves were excluded
from official religious societies and were deemed "profane," 93 African
American slaves suffered a similar treatment in terms of exclusion. Initially,
American slaveholders justified their institution on the ground that the slaves
were not Christian, 94 and thus could be enslaved without any moral concerns.
Colonial legislatures prohibited baptism of slaves to ensure that slaves retained
their profane status. 95 Eventually, slaves were baptized and some Christians
96
were enslaved, and profanity came to be defined by race instead of religion.
African American slaves were no longer excluded from the Christian religion
but they were not allowed to practice it in an unregulated manner. State slave
codes required the presence of overseers at gatherings of slaves, 97 and any
reasonably intelligent slaveholder would have made sure to be present at any
religious ceremony held by slaves. For if the slaveholder or his representative
were not present, the slave's god, speaking through earthly ministers, would
have talked at length about perceived evils of the institution, encouraging
insurrection. With the slaveholder present, slave religion could do little more
than encourage acceptance and acquiescence.
Smith's description of the turning out and leaving to die of old and diseased
slaves in ancient Rome appears in his description of hardships which are not
"commonly taken notice of by writers," 98 a category that I have relabeled as
social torts. If one were to generalize, the Roman treatment of old or diseased
slaves could be described as an example of a general status deprivation, or
90 DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN,

U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR

NATIONAL ACTION (1965) (explaining how history has created an instable Negro family

structure).
91 JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: How OUR CULTURE HAS WEAKENED

FAMILIES 126-29 (2002) (describing how the familial hardships that slaves endured has
become a legacy inherited by modem African Americans).
92 SMITH, supra note 15, at 179.
93 Id.
94 See GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 31 (2002).

95 See Kevin Mumford, After Hugh: Statutory Race Segregation in Colonial America,
1630-1725, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 280, 284 (1999). Most historical accounts, however,

stress the reluctance of individual slaveholders, rather than laws, as the reason slaveholders
tried to ensure that their slaves would not be baptized. See ALBERT J. RABOTEAU, SLAVE
RELIGION: THE "INVISIBLE INSTITUTION" IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 98 (1978) (describing

how slaveholders were afraid that baptism would emancipate their slaves).
96 See ELKINS, supra note 23, at 50 (describing how a series of laws enacted in the late
1600s left no doubt that converting to Christianity did not affect slave status).
97 See STAMPP, supra note 13, at 208. It was against the law for a slave to preach to a
group of fellow slaves without his master being present. Id.
98 SMITH, supra note 15, at 178, 181.
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defaming based on status. Slaves in the South do not appear to have been
turned out to die, but they received a far different treatment at death than
whites. Slave burials took place at night, so that they would not interfere with
work.99 Accidents that resulted in the deaths of slaves were typically described
as investment losses to the slaveholders.' 0 0 These examples are sufficient to
suggest that status deprivation was also a significant part of the South's slave
regime.
Although Fogel and Engerman report that slaves developed
marketable skills and moved into managerial positions on slave farms, 10 1 these
achievements are diminished by the fact that the slaveholder could always
claim that the skills were developed only by the slaveholder's grace.
The question generated by these social torts is whether and how they could
form part of a claim for damages. The socialization of marriage could be
analogized to a claim for "loss of consortium" or destruction of marital
services, which is a compensable tort. 102 The claim would surely be valid for
marriages that the slaveholder destroyed. Aside from this claim, however, the
standard tort categories are inadequate for many of the injuries connected to
the social torts. The defendants threw their victims into a regime in which
their own incentives led them produce new injuries. It is entirely plausible that
slave marriages, rigged so that the incentives of each party would encourage
putting short-term gain ahead of long-term investment, produced some of the
most serious injuries. 10 3 Nonetheless, conventional tort doctrine would seem
to deny liability on the part of the slaveholder for the injuries connected to this
incentive structure.
Consider the precariousness of the slave marriage. The institution replaced

99 See, EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 197

(1976);
Michael
Trinkley,
Slave
Burials
in
South
Carolina,
at
http://www.sciway.net/afam/slavery/burials.html (accessed Sept. 29, 2004).
100 See STAMPP, supra note 13, at 204. For example, a Tennessee judge once explained
to a slaveholder whose slave had died from neglect that he ought to learn how to exact the
greatest amount of service from his slaves. Id.
101FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supra note 53, at 38-43 (describing how slavery produced a
hierarchical structure that closely resembled the occupational pyramid - e.g. laborers,
skilled workers, managers).
102 See PROSSER, supra note 34, § 125.
103 Empirical evidence suggests that the slave marriage may have been the most
significant harm in terms of the duration of its effects. See, e.g., BRUCE SACERDOTE,
SLAVERY AND THE INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF HUMAN CAPITAL 17-18 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9227, 2002), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9227 (accessed Sept. 30, 2004). Examining Census records
from 1920, Bruce Sacerdote finds that there was no discernable difference in literacy and
income between grandchildren of slaves and free blacks, but that the descendents of slaves
were more likely to be raised in a female-headed household. Id. Assuming that the
likelihood of being in a female-headed household is correlated with the family stability
disincentives under slavery, Sacerdote's results are evidence of the significant crossgenerational effect of the slave marriage.
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the property-like expectations of conventional marriage with the slaveholder's
evaluation of what is reasonable. The slave couple knew, under this regime,
that their marriage could be terminated at any moment, depending on the needs
or desires of the slaveholder. Game theory predicts that short horizons
encourage cheating in cooperative relationships.10 4 Knowing that the "game"
could come to an end at any time, each party has little reason to forgo an
uncooperative "deviation" in order to preserve the relationship for the long
term. Thus, precariousness by itself encourages conduct that undermines
stable relationships. Where the incentive to cheat is strong because the risk of
involuntary break up is significant, both parties to the marriage have incentives
to cheat, leading to the standard result of the Prisoner's Dilemma in which the
welfare of both parties is below the level they would achieve if they
cooperated. But it is unlikely that any court would permit someone to collect
damages for the harms brought about by poor incentives to cooperate.
Unlike the standard loss of consortium claim, the slave spouse, in the case of
a slave marriage that has not been broken up by the slaveholder, has not been
denied the society, services, or capacity for sexual intercourse with his or her
mate. Instead, the institution strips out the expectation of stability and the
fundamental material obligations of marriage. To some this might seem to be
a boon: sex without obligations. In reality, however, it is likely to have been at
least as harmful over the long term as the type of injury that leads to a tort
claim for loss of consortium. Indeed, this is a classic example in which the
shortening of horizons caused by the weakening of a property right produces
the potential for a short-term gain coupled with a much larger long-term
loss. 10 5 Ulysses, untied from the mast, would have to rely on his wits to
choose the proper course of action.
As another example, consider the fact that the male was "relieved" of the
responsibility to provide for and defend his wife and children. A court might
view this as a benefit rather than an injury, since many parents would consider
it a relief to discover that they did not have to pay for their child's food or
clothing. But along with this relief comes a denial of responsibility for these
fundamental aspects of parenthood, as well as a denial of the right of control
over many aspects of childrearing. To this we should add the precariousness
mentioned before; at any time the male could be separated. Few parents would
voluntarily accept this tradeoff. But how would you evaluate the damages, and
is there a standard claim to which this injury could be analogized?
'04 To be precise, the "cheat" or "defect" strategy is the equilibrium in any finitely
iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. See LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 28, at 97-102.
05 The traditional example is where the abolition of property rights leads to a struggle

among neighbors to expropriate each other's property. While the short-term incentive to
expropriate is strong, almost everyone loses in the long run under this regime. Another way
of describing this problem is that the shortening of horizons caused by the weakening of a
property right generates "time-inconsistent" preferences. On the general time-inconsistency
problem, see generally R. H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility
Maximization, 23 REv. ECON. STUD. 165 (1955-1956).
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The other substantial social tort, exclusion from religious freedom, is
equally hard to shoehorn into a claim for damages under tort law. It is a
substantial harm nonetheless that should not be overlooked because of this
difficulty. As Smith notes, the demand for religion increases with the
harshness and uncertainty of life. 0 6 Slavery - whether in ancient Rome, the
American South, or any other place in the world - creates a social structure in
which those whose lives are most uncertain and harsh are the ones denied
religious freedom.'0 7 Religious freedom is greatest in these regimes for the
wealthy, who have the least need or desire for it.
I have so far restricted this discussion to private harms that could potentially
be addressed through the tort system. I have not talked about wider social
harms and the ways in which slavery created a social order that left both slave
and slaveholder populations worse off. As I said before, the institution can be
analogized to the Prisoner's Dilemma in sequential form. The slaveholder's
initial decision to enslave sets in play a series of actions that lead to large
losses in society's welfare.
Smith pointed to three significant social costs of slavery. One cost is
slavery's tendency to turn democracies into oppressive and unstable
governments. 10 8 Smith argued that under a monarchy, in contrast, the king and
people in the lower ranks often find their interests aligned against the class of
wealthy landowners. 10 9 The king is most afraid of the landowner class because
landowners have control over substantial resources that can be used to check
his power."l 0 In order to constrain the landowners, the king will sometimes
expand the freedoms of the lower ranks, which Smith argued was the general
trend that led to the demise of slavery in Europe."' Under democracy,
however, and especially the system in ancient Rome, the landowner class will
always vote to maintain its control over slaves. Landowners will vote against
every proposed constitutional change that might weaken their control over
slaves, and they will vote in favor of oppressive laws that secure their safety
and power. The general fear of slaves will lead landowners to support corrupt
law enforcement regimes that target the slave class rather than targeting
criminal conduct in general. 112 The paradoxical result is that democracy,

106 SMITH,
107

supra note 15, at 179.

See id.

08 Id. at 181-82 (explaining how strict and brutal force was needed to obtain obedience

because the slave population outnumbered the free and the state constantly feared
uprisings).
109Id. at 187-89.
110Id.
"I Id.
112 On the social costs of targeted law enforcement, see KEITH N. HYLTON &
VIKRAMADITYA S. KHANNA, TOWARD AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 9-18

(Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 01-02, 2002),
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers (accessed Oct. 10, 2004).

available at

1232

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 84:1209

usually an institution thought to be conducive to the spread of liberty, becomes
a rigid barrier to the extension of freedom under slavery. To the extent this
characteristic of slavery impedes the spread of democracy or contributes to its
instability, this has to be counted as a significant cost.
The second social cost, also a paradox, is that slavery makes the attainment
of wealth potentially harmful to others by increasing the external costs of
wealth acquisition. In a free market, Smith argued, the entrepreneur provides
external benefits to others by moving resources to more productive uses,
expanding employment and consumption."1 3 Under slavery, the entrepreneur
who improves his position bottles up the transmission of wealth by hiring an
ever-larger pool of slaves to take over production that would otherwise be
farmed out to free laborers.1 4 And along with large slave holdings comes the
greater need to oppress the slaves in order to secure their obedience.
The third social cost, related to the second, is that society's wealth is lower
under slavery than under a regime in which the same individuals are employed
as free laborers. This is because:
the cultivation of land by slaves is not so advantageous as by free tenents;
that the advantage gained by the labours [slaves] of the slaves, if we
deduce their originall cost and the expence of their maintenanc<e>, will
not be as great as that which is gaind from free tenents. In the antient
governments where slaves were the sole cultivators of the land the
method was to assign them a piece of ground to cultivate, all the produce
of which belong'd to their master, except what he allowed to them for
their maintenance. We find that this part which was over that which was
necessary for the maintenance of the cultivators in the fruitfull countries
of Greece and Italy was about 1/6 part of the produce, whereas in
Scotland and England where the rents are high the tenent pays 1/3 part for
the rent. The cultivation of the land of Greece and Italy must evidently
from thence have been very bad, when they produced only 1/6 part more
than was necessary to maintain the cultivators, altho the soil be
exceedingly fruitfull and the climate very favourable; whereas the barren
and cold countries of Scot. and Eng. afford 2ce as much to the
landlord .... 115
This evidence demonstrates the inefficiency of slavery. The reason for the
inefficiency is that:
[t]he slave or villain who cultivated the land cultivated it entirely for his
master; whatever it produced over and above his maintenance belonged to
the landlord; he had therefore no inducement to be at any great expense or
trouble in manuring or tilling the land; if he made it produce what was
sufficient for his own maintenance this was all that he was anxious about.

113 SMITH, supra note 15, at 195.

114 Id. at 194-96.

115 Id. at 185 (alteration in original).
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The overseer perhaps by a hearty drubbing or other hard usage might
make him exert himself a little farther, so as to produce from the farm a
small portion for the landlord; but this would not be very great ....116
Smith's account stands in contrast to that of Fogel and Engerman, who
1 17
claim that slave farms were roughly one third more efficient than free farms.
Fogel and Engerman also show, however, that the large farms in the South
were almost exclusively slave operated and that these farms were able to take
advantage of scale economies, which are significant in agriculture. 118
Although Fogel and Engerman claim that scale economies do not account for
the entire efficiency advantage of slave farms, 119 their argument in support of
this claim suggests the opposite. In particular, three significant weaknesses
stand out. First, they concede that "there were no large-scale southern farms
based on free wage labor," 120 which would seem to make it virtually
impossible to separate the portion of the slave-farm efficiency advantage due
to slavery from that due to large-scale operation. Second, Fogel and Engerman
concede that they did not estimate economies in distribution, only economies
in production. 12
Third, their explanation of the slave-farm efficiency
advantage emphasizes the distribution economies introduced by the steamboat
in the 1820s and developments in management methods, 122 neither of which

116

Id. at 185-86.

17 FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supra note 53, at 191-209 (describing a measure of agricultural
efficiency called the "geometric index of total factor productivity," which indicates that
Southern slave farms enjoyed a higher level of efficiency than their Northern counterparts
who did not utilize slaves).
118Id. at 194. Fogel and Engerman describe the concept behind a scale economy as "a
single large farm using given quantities of inputs could produce more output than a group of
small farms which together used the same quantity of inputs." Id. at 192.
119 Id. at 192-94 (asserting that mid-size plantations had certain advantages in production
over the large plantations).
120 Id. at 194.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 199-209. Only one of Fogel and Engerman's claims suggests that the efficiency
of slave labor was special. Fogel and Engerman note, quoting one observer of the time, that
slaves could be "driven" in a way that free workers could not. Id. at 205. One could view
this as another example of the benefits of scale economies - that with large production
teams, a manager could mechanize the process of physical labor. On the other hand,
perhaps Fogel and Engerman mean to say that slave labor has a special quality that makes it
ideal for being driven. If this is true, one has to wonder what the source of this quality could
be. Could it be that men are induced to work harder by the crack of the whip than by the
lure of extra pay? More precisely, could it be that the extra pay necessary to make a farm
hand work long hours in the hot sun was simply beyond the means of Southern farmers, and
this forced them to rely on the whip in order to produce a large quantity at a cost that would
at least allow them to break even? If this is the explanation for the "efficiency" of slave
labor, then it should be clear that slave labor was not efficient in the standard sense of the
term. Such a theory of "efficiency" would lead one to argue that an accomplished art thief
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suggest any particular advantage of slave relative to free labor. Steamboat
diffusion and better management techniques should have contributed greatly to
the realization of scale economies, and given this, their argument can be
interpreted as support for the claim that the entire slave farm efficiency
advantage resulted from scale economies. 123 In addition to these weaknesses,
124
Fogel and Engerman's evidence of a low rate of slave labor expropriation
seems to contradict their efficiency thesis and to support Smith's view that the
institution is inferior in its capacity for motivating productive effort.
Even if Fogel and Engerman were to produce virtually incontrovertible
statistical support for the claim that southern slave labor was more efficient
than free labor, 125 after separating out the part of the slave farm efficiency
advantage due to scale economies, I would still find the claim hard to believe.
It flies in the face of concrete historical evidence. The flaw in slavery as an
economic system is that it replaces profit-seeking as a motivation for effort
with the command and control of the slaveholder. In this sense, slavery
belongs in the same class as feudalism and communism as an economic
system. Anyone who takes a short look at comparisons between agriculture in
communist and free market systems will see striking evidence of the
inefficiency of command-and-control. Compare, for example, agriculture in
the U.S. and in the Soviet Union. Or, compare agriculture in South Korea to
that in North Korea; Taiwan versus China (pre-1978), Hong Kong versus
China, Florida versus Cuba.' 26
is an "efficient" producer of works of art.
123 See Donald F. Schaefer & Mark D. Schmitz, The Relative Efficiency of Slave

Agriculture: A Comment, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 208 (1979) (refuting Fogel and Engerman's
contention that the southern slave-driven agricultural system was more efficient than its
northern counterpart).
124FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supra note 53, at 153.

125 For econometric critiques of the Fogel and Engerman argument, see Paul A. David &
Peter Temin, Explaining the Relative Efficiency of Slave Agriculture in the Antebellum
South: Comment, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 213 (1979); Thomas L. Haskell, Explaining the
Relative Efficiency of Slave Agriculture in the Antebellum South: A Reply to FogelEngerman, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 206 (1979).
126Obviously there is a big difference between the relative efficiency of agriculture in
the pre-1990 Soviet Union and in America, on one hand, and the North and South during the
period of American slavery, on the other hand. The slave system in the South was not
clearly less efficient than the North, if one merely compares levels of agricultural
productivity. See FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supra note 53, at i94. But, as I noted above, this
comparison is obscured by the existence of much larger farms in the South. My claim here
is that command-and-control systems have shown themselves to be inferior to market-based
systems. Slavery in the South was not a thorough command-and-control system. In every
way besides the master-slave relationship, the South operated under a market-based system.
However, the master-slave relationship is one piece of the system in the South that operated
under command-and-control principles. If large free farms existed in competition with the
large slave farms of the South, history suggests that the free farms would have eventually
prevailed.
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There is a fourth social cost that should be added to Smith's list. Unlike
Roman slavery, American slavery contributed greatly to the spread and
resilience of racism. Slavery gave racist attitudes an economic function that
would otherwise not have existed. First, the propagation of racist beliefs
served the dominant slaveholding class by reducing the likelihood that bonds
would form between poor whites and slaves,"2 7 whose economic interests were
in many respects very similar. Slavery depressed the wages of free laborers
and limited their work opportunities. Wealthy landowners had no need to hire
free laborers. By convincing poor white laborers that slavery was in some
sense consistent with the natural order, an order that put them on a higher level
than slaves, landowners forestalled or possibly prevented the buildup of
political pressure to abolish slavery. Since people are by nature status seeking,
racist attitudes offered poor whites a sense of comfort and superiority that
made them less willing to challenge existing institutions. Second, racism also
served an economic function by reducing the payoff to slaves from gaining
freedom. In the presence of a thick social atmosphere of racism, many slaves
must have rationally discounted the benefits of attaining freedom, which may
explain the bizarre phenomenon of voluntary re-enslavement.128 Third, racism

127

See

DAVID LYONS, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: RACIAL JUNCTURES IN US HISTORY AND

14-16 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 02-06, 2002)
available at http://bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/LyonsD061702abstract.html (accessed Sept.
29, 2004) (suggesting that slaveholders propagated racist beliefs in order to drive wedges
between poor whites and slaves after Bacon's rebellion). Slaveholders feared that if bonds
formed between poor whites and slaves, poor whites, who were in the majority, might
legislatively overturn the slave regime - or, even worse, the two groups might join together
to violently overthrow the regime. Examples of the latter are Bacon's Rebellion of 1676,
see id. at 12, and Gabriel's Conspiracy of 1800. See Public Broadcasting Service, Gabriel's
Conspiracy, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part3/3pl576.html (accessed Oct. 11, 2004)
(discussing the slave uprising, which included the aid of many poor whites, that was
discovered the day before the revolt was supposed to break). The notion that racism served
the purpose of the dominant class by preventing the formation of alliances between blacks
and poor whites is suggested by C. Van Woodward's treatment of the history of Jim Crow.
C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 85-87 (2d ed. 1966) (discussing
the movement to disfranchise black voters). Woodward notes that the effort to disfranchise
black voters led to the disfranchisement of many poor whites as well, though exceptions
were designed to allow whites to vote. Id. The promotion of racism served to discourage
poor whites from blocking the poll tax and other disfranchisement tactics. For another
account suggesting that racism may have served the purpose of preventing bonds from
forming between poor whites and slaves, see GENOVESE, supra note 99, at 23. Genovese
writes, "[w]hite men sometimes were linked to slave insurrectionary plots, and each such
incident rekindled fears. By deciding that lower-class whites who associated with blacks
were 'degraded,' the slaveholders explained away the existence of such racial contacts and
avoided reflecting on the possibility that genuine sympathy might exist across racial lines.
They also upheld stem police measures against whites who illicitly fraternized with blacks,
and justified a widespread attempt to keep white and black laborers apart." Id.
THEIR LEGACY

128 See, e.g., ROBERT B. SHAW, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY 44 (1991).
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served an economic function by helping deter slave insurrections. The strong
need to deter insurrections justified the use of oppressive force on large farms
and harsh law enforcement directed toward slaves. The propagation of racist
beliefs helped make oppressive law enforcement policies aimed at slaves
acceptable to the general public.
Racism of the type generated from American slavery is socially costly. It is
not simply a matter of people having tastes or beliefs, for which they
eventually pay in a competitive market. 129 Nor is racism a product, as some
have proposed, of making statistical judgments based on experience, 130 as
might be expected if success in business depended on making good estimates
of the behavior of others. The racism of southern slavery was propagated as a
belief structure designed to help maintain a socially undesirable institution and
has no basis in efficiency or in free association and expression. In addition to
helping support the institution of slavery, racism produced violent attacks on
African Americans for several generations after slavery ended. 131 Once racism
is put in this context, it appears as a gross mistake to think that it has anything
to do with people being free to associate with whomever they wish or to make
efficient statistical predictions about the competence of potential employees or
customers. And while this virulent form of racism remains in existence,
statistical discrimination and the occasional discrimination that comes along
with being free to choose your associates both become tainted by the ease with
which the virulent form can mingle with the statistical form and the free
association form without being detected.
Like a resilient virus, racism has a tendency to replicate itself in successive
generations and is to some extent self-confirming. On the institutional level,
an agency such as a police force will tend to screen for applicants that hold the
same views and will train according to methods that have been used in the past
in order to avoid dissension within the agency. Thus, racism once embedded
in an institution is likely to remain for several generations. On the individual

129

I refer to the "taste-based discrimination" theory. See

ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 16-17 (2d ed. 1971).

GARY S. BECKER,

THE

Taste-based discrimination theory

postulates that people may choose to discriminate based on their preferences, even if they
know that they are giving up productivity by selecting a candidate that meets their tastes.

See id.
130 1 refer to the "statistical discrimination" theory. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of
Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3, 23-27 (Orley Ashenfelter &
Albert Rees eds., 1973) (applying statistical discrimination theory to generic variables in
order to show that there are cost-saving incentives to make generalizations about a potential
employee's productivity based on immutable characteristics); Edmund S. Phelps, The
Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 659, 659 (1972) (applying
statistical discrimination theory stating that employers make decisions based on racial
stereotypes if the cost of gaining information about an individual is too high).
131 For a history of lynching, see PHILLIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN:
THE LYNCHING OF BLACK AMERICA 457 (2002) (writing that public lynching of African

Americans did not end until 1934).
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level, oppressive laws, and wealth and status differentials remain long after
slavery's prohibition. The beneficiaries of these differentials have an incentive
to continue to accept and even to promote racism as a belief structure in order
to maintain their benefits. The beliefs are self-confirming to the extent that a
racist law enforcement policy deters law abiding African Americans from
132
walking the street to a greater extent then the policy deters criminals.
Economic models of discrimination by Becker, Phelps, and Arrow describe
the categories of taste-based and statistical discrimination. 133
This
categorization has influenced other social scientists, especially economists, to
study these types of discrimination under the belief that these categories
encompass every conceivable type of racism. However, the type of racism
generated by slavery in the South is arguably different from both taste-based
and statistical discrimination. Taste-based discrimination is a competitive
disadvantage to its practitioners, and competition tends to punish them over the
long term. Statistical discrimination is a competitive advantage to the extent
its practitioners are accurate and a competitive disadvantage to the extent they
are mistaken. The oppressive or virulent racism generated by slavery,
however, is tautologically an advantage because it is designed to maintain
134
differences in wealth and status.
II. DERIVATIVE CLAIMS
The FleetBoston complaint demanded compensation for conversion of the
value of plaintiffs' ancestors' slave labor. 135 The conversion claim is
132 On the boot-strapping nature of discriminatory beliefs generally, see GLENN LOURY,

loan officers might not
grant credit extensions to minorities if they hold, and act on, the negative stereotype that
African Americans are more likely to default on loans).
133See BECKER, supra note 129, at 16-17; Phelps, supra note 130, at 659. The former
refers to discrimination based on preferences and the latter to discrimination based on
THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 23-25 (2002) (discussing how

rational predictions.
134 Perhaps McAdams comes closest to this view in his description of racism as the result
of status seeking. See Richard McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of
Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1044 (1995)
(arguing that people have incentives to disparage the characteristics of others in order to
elevate their own status in comparison). McAdams' theory is hard to distinguish from tastebased discrimination, however, because people have a taste for status, which leads them to
discriminate. Under this theory, racism is a disadvantage in some settings. Under the view
I propose in the text, racism is always an advantage, at least at its propagation sources. In a
similar sense, Fredrickson defines racism as the combination of "difference" based on
immutable characteristics coupled with "power". See FREDRICKSON, supra note 94, at 9
(proposing that immutable characteristics provide the majority a motive for using their
power advantage to treat those what do not have such characteristics in ways that would
otherwise be deemed cruel). Fredrickson tries to distinguish this notion of racism from that
of personal tastes or xenophobia. Id.
135See Complaint, supra note 1, at 17; Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 58-60.
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derivative because it is brought by descendants of victims rather than direct
victims. Derivative plaintiffs are distinguished from heirs, who are direct
victims when someone takes the real property or savings of their parents the
moment after their death. Reparations plaintiffs, however, are not in the same
position as heirs cheated out of their inheritances.
Their claims are
considerably more distant, and hence better viewed as derivative rather than
direct. Reparations plaintiffs claim that if their ancestors had been paid the
value of their labor beyond what was required to maintain them, that value
would have been passed down to their descendants over several generations.
A.

Tort Law and Derivative Claims

Tort law traditionally has been unreceptive to derivative claims. One
famous case, H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 136 involved a warehouse
that was burned down after the water company neglected to supply adequate
water through its fire hydrant to put out the fire. The company had signed a
contract with the city of Rensselaer to supply water for public use. 137 The
court held that the water company was not liable to the warehouse owner for
its failure to supply adequate water because its duty extended only to the city,
which was the only party in contract with the water company. 38 Although the
court did not use the language of proximate cause or foreseeability, in effect
the decision says that the company's failure to supply adequate water was not a
proximate or foreseeable cause of the plaintiffs injury.
Moch exemplifies how the legal concept of proximate cause differs from the
common sense usage. If a water company cuts off water to a fire hydrant
while a nearby building is on fire, then to most of us it is perfectly foreseeable
that an injury will follow. The decision in Moch, therefore, cannot be
defended on an intuitive notion of foreseeability. The concept of proximate
cause is being used in Moch to screen out cases in which the court
thinks there
139
are good policy arguments for not holding the defendant liable.
Tort law's stinginess toward derivative claims is also demonstrated in Ryan
v. New York CentralRailroadCo., where the court considered the extent of a
defendant's liability when it is responsible for a fire that bums down one
home, and then spreads to bum down others. 140 The court adopted a bright line

136

159 N.E. 896, 898-99 (N.Y. 1928).

137 Id.
138 Id.

(holding that extending a company's tort liability to an indefinite number of

potential beneficiaries of a contract would unduly and unfairly extend that company's duty
of care).
139In particular, note that there is a large and undefined class of potential victims in
Moch, each of whom could avoid the risk of uncompensated loss through insurance. It
would be difficult for a water company to estimate the potential liability, and the cost of
liability insurance could be so large that it would be unprofitable for the company to supply
water to the average customer.
14035 N.Y. 210 (1866) (holding that a negligent tortfeasor is only liable for the first
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rule holding the defendant liable for the first home, but not for the others. 141
Thus, if the defendant's negligently-caused fire bums down home A and then
spreads to homes B, C, and all the way to Z, the defendant will be held liable
only for burning down A. The fires that spread to homes B through Z are
derivative harms. Although it is intuitive and foreseeable that a fire in a
densely built neighborhood could spread to homes B through Z, the court
restricted liability on the basis that such extensive liability would discourage
42
legitimate activity. 1
Most relevant for reparations claims are the traditional rules governing the
survival of tort claims. Prosser notes that there were three traditional rules: (1)
the claim against the defendant did not survive the defendant's death; (2) the
plaintiffs claim did not survive the plaintiff's death; (3) the survivors of the
plaintiff could not bring damages for his death. 143 The first two rules can be
defended by common sense. If the defendant dies, then why should the court
allow you to sue someone else, like his wife? After all, the defendant's wife is
not responsible for your injury. Similarly, if the plaintiff dies, why should the
court allow someone else to sue for his damages?
Denying survivors the right to sue for the support supplied by a family
member killed by the defendant's negligence, however, is hard to understand
on common sense grounds. Under this rule, defendants have a perverse
incentive to kill rather than merely injure victims. Repeat player defendants
such as railroads must have been aware, in the period before the legislative
creation of wrongful death actions, that it was better from a financial
perspective to have dead bodies strewn about an accident scene than injured
bodies. Requiring defendants to pay for the loss of support to family members
dependent on the deceased is more consistent with the deterrent aim of tort law
recognized by some theorists as the dominant rationale by the late nineteenth
44
century. 1
Why then, would early tort law reject a claim for wrongful death on the part
of family members? While the case law and commentary provide no clear
explanation, the most likely reason can be discerned by comparing the
wrongful death claim to the traditional tort claim. The traditional tort claim
was brought by a plaintiff who had been injured by the defendant. The
plaintiff would seek damages aimed at restoring him to the welfare level he
had before the injury. It is easy in this case to see how the injury has hurt the
plaintiff and to determine a compensating amount for objectively quantifiable
injuries. For example, medical expenses incurred and wages the victim lost or

house that is burned down by his negligent act).
141

Id. at 213.

142 Id. at 217 (pronouncing that finding liability in this situation, "would be the

destruction of all civilized society").
143 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 125A (5th

ed. 1984).
144 See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 16, Lecture III.
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would be unable to earn as a result of the injury are relatively easy to quantify.
In the wrongful death case, however, the damage claim is based on a
counterfactual. The plaintiff is saying: If the deceased had continued to live,
he would have continued to support me at a certain rate. Traditional courts
found this too speculative. 145 They did not want to entertain suits in which the
plaintiff claimed that the injured party would have paid her some amount per
year if he had not been killed by the defendant's negligence. Although such
claims are routine today, they are still speculative. Far too many external
factors can affect one's ability to support another. Suppose the victim had
earned $50,000 per year. We have no way of knowing that he would have
continued to earn as much or more. He might have decided to quit his job to
take a lower paying job, or he may have been fired. Even if he had continued
to earn the same amount, he might have decided not to use it all to support his
46

spouse. 1

Statutes passed during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth
century changed the law regarding wrongful death claims. 147 Now certain
relatives of the deceased - usually husband, wife, parent, or child - can collect
damages under the wrongful death statute. 48 This is an improvement on
deterrence grounds because it lessens the incentive a potential tortfeasor,
especially a repeat player like a railroad, has to kill rather than merely injure its
victim. On the other hand, wrongful death actions introduce a level of
speculativeness in the proof of damages that was not part of traditional tort
doctrine. The tradeoff involves the acceptance of a less accurate and more
costly dispute resolution process in exchange for a potentially greater deterrent
effect.
B.

Reparationsas a Derivative Claim

The reparations claims brought by descendants of slaves take the speculative
quality of wrongful death actions to a new level. Consider, for example, the
141

See PROSSER, supra note 34, § 127.

146Alfred Brophy reminded me that during the period in which courts denied wrongful

death claims brought by survivors, they allowed slaveholders to obtain compensation for the
negligent killing of a slave. See Brophy, supra note 5. Although this seems at first to be a
puzzle or inconsistency, it is quite consistent with the traditional assumptions under which
courts treated derivative claims. In the case of the slaveholder, courts operated under the
assumption that he had a legal right to the income earned by the slave. At most, the slave
had a fight to the portion necessary for his maintenance. In the case of the surviving wife,
however, she had no legal claim over the husband's income, given the law at the time. This
difference suggests that courts awarded compensation to slave owners because their claims
did not depend on the victim's (the slave's) willingness to hand money over to the plaintiff.
141 See PROSSER, supra note 34, § 127, at 902-03 (commenting how the American states
began to pass wrongful death statutes and survival acts after England passed the Fatal
Accident's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (Eng.), which granted a cause of action to relatives
of a deceased against a tortfeasor).
148Id. § 127, at 904.
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claim for uncompensated labor. While one may argue that there is a breach of
contract claim, the slaveholder and slave never signed a contract agreeing to
specific terms of compensation. For this reason I will continue to treat slave
reparations as a claim for damages connected to the initial tort of wrongful
confinement. To be sure, there is an equally if not more attractive claim for
restitution based on unjust enrichment, but I will return to this later.
Similar to the wrongful death action, the reparations claim for unpaid wages
asks the court to assume that the victim would have continued working and
that he would have passed his earnings on to dependents. That the slave had
weak incentives to pass his money on to his wife or his children due to the
precariousness of the relationship with his family is not reason to reduce the
plaintiff's damages. Precariousness would have given the slave a strong
incentive to spend his money on his own desires right away. But the fact that
there was always a hovering risk that he might be forced to leave his
"Kentucky home" was not the slave's fault, but is simply part of the harm
connected to the initial tort of confinement.
To avoid reducing damages to descendants for a reason that was not only
beyond the slave's control but a foreseeable consequence of the initial injury,
we should assume that if paid, the slave would have passed the money on at
the same rate as parents in conventional families do. The problem that remains
is the passage of time, which allows for many opportunities for money to be
squandered or used in other ways. If we assume that the average father will
save and pass on to his children about eighty percent of all of the money he
earns above what is needed for his own maintenance, which is probably
generous, 49 then a claim for unpaid wages by the first generation seems
permissible. However, the likelihood of the same amount being passed on to
the second generation falls to 64 percent, then to 51 percent for the third
generation, and down to 41 percent for the fourth generation. If we take 1865
as the final year of slavery, and thirty years to represent a generation, then we
are roughly four and a half generations beyond the period of slavery now.
Because of the uncertainty created by the passage of time, a sort of scholarly
consensus seems to have emerged that the demands for slave labor damages
brought by the immediate descendants of Holocaust victims have a
considerably greater moral claim to compensation than those of African
Americans. In particular, corrective justice theorists have made three
arguments that tend to support such a distinction. One argument is based on
the notion of causation, and holds roughly that claims by distant descendants
should be regarded as weak (in a moral sense) or undeserving of compensation
because of the intervention of so many accidental and intentional acts that have
141 See, e.g., KERWIN KOFI CHARLES & ERIK HURST, THE CORRELATION OF WEALTH
ACROSS GENERATIONS 7 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9314, 2002),

availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w9314 (accessed Oct. 5, 2004). Charles and Hurst
find that the elasticity of child wealth with respect to parental wealth is .37. Id. Thus, a one
dollar increase in parental wealth generally leads to an increase of 37 cents in child wealth.
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played a role in disadvantaging claimants. George Sher, a moral theorist, and
Boris Bittker, a legal theorist, have offered versions of this argument. 150 A
second argument is based on the notion of indeterminacy, and holds that claims
by distant descendants are weak because it is impossible, given the potential
for intervention, to know what position claimants would have been in if their
ancestors had not suffered the injury which motivates the claim for
reparations. 15' A third argument is based on the notion of rights fading or
extinguishing over time, and holds that claims by distant descendants are
undeserving of compensation because too much time has passed and
expectations have settled.
Jeremy Waldron also made the last two
153
arguments, 152 and Janna Thompson offered a version of the third.
The new-formed consensus among corrective justice theorists suggests that
the slavery claims based on the Holocaust are morally deserving of

150 See

BORIS 1. BITrKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS

88-89 (1973) (arguing that

external factors such as the isolation of ghettos have contributed to the injury experienced
by African Americans). Bittker favors reparations, but argues that they should be based on
discriminatory or oppressive policies that operate in the present or very recent past. Id.; see
also George Sher, Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 13-14
(1981) (arguing that the more time passes between the original wrong and the derivative
claimant, the more likely the injury will be based on external factors besides the original
wrong).
151 I should take a moment to distinguish one version of the indeterminacy argument that
should be rejected right away. That is the argument that African Americans have no moral
claim to compensation because they would not exist as citizens in the U.S. if their ancestors
had not been brought over as slaves. *For a discussion of this argument, see Sher, supra note
150, at 6-8. This argument seems superficially appealing only if one chooses to lump all of
the actions of slaveholders together in one discrete mass. However, the pattern of historical
injustices can (and should) be broken down into the many different discrete instances in
which a choice with moral implications was presented. See, e.g., LYONS, supra note 128, at
48-49 (suggesting that there are far more injured parties than just the direct descendants of
slaves, as the fall of slavery spawned Jim Crow legislation, which in turn has had an
injurious effect on all African Americans, including those that are not direct descendants of
slaves). Slavery involved an extremely large number of discrete events of this type. After
bringing the slave over in chains, the slaveholder had a choice whether to force him to work
the first day or set him free, the same choice the second day, the third day, and so on. Each
decision to continue as slaveholder would seem to deserve moral condemnation.
152 Jeremy Waldron, Superseding HistoricalInjustice, 103 ETHICS 4 (1992). For another
account, see Sher, supra note 150, at 6-9. On the notion that the moral basis of a right to
property fades or changes over time, see David Lyons, The New Indian Claims and the
OriginalRights to Land, 4 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 249, 264-65 (1977), arguing that property
rights are not stable even within one generation.
153 Janna Thompson, Historical Injustice and Reparation: Justifying Claims of
Descendants, 112 ETHICS 114, 121 (2001) (commenting on Waldron's theory of superseding
historical reparations claims, which states that reparations claims become weaker as time
goes by because people living off of the resources wrongly taken may be unjustly displaced
by awarding reparations).
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compensation while those of African Americans are not.15 4 This is an arbitrary
dividing line because there are many reasons to question whether money would
have been passed on even to the first generation. As Thompson notes, Robert
Nozick ran into this problem, though stated in more general terms, in the
course of setting out principles for distributive justice, 155 and refused to try to
draw a line between generations that deserved reparative justice
("rectification") and those that did not.1 56 Still, the reasoning of modem
consensus is consistent with the approach of traditional tort law, particularly
the Ryan case, which holds that the defendant's liability stops the moment the
fire spreads from the first home. 157 In the same sense, a consensus view seems
to be emerging that liability for slave labor stops the moment the damage
spreads from the first generation of descendants.1 58
Since the slave was not paid as a regular laborer, and the value of his effort
above what was necessary to maintain him went to the slaveholder, it may be
appropriate to treat slave labor damages as a claim for restitution. The
FleetBoston reparations complaint included a claim for restitution. 159 Under a
restitution theory, the slaveholder would be asked to return to his victim the
gain or profit he enjoyed as a result of slavery. This would lead to a larger
damage claim than one based on unpaid wages. For example, if the value of an
hour of the slave's work to the slaveholder was $20, and the slaveholder paid
the slave (in terms of food and housing) $10, then a claim for unpaid wages
might lead to a damage award equal to the difference between the wage that
would have been paid and the $10 actually paid. If the wage that would have
been paid was $14, then the damage award would be equal to $4 multiplied by
the number of hours. A claim for restitution, however, would lead to a damage
award equal to $10 multiplied by the number of hours.
114 For an earlier and dissenting view (specifically, a rather rigid moral argument
favoring reparations for both recent and distant injuries), see Bernard Boxill, The Morality
of Reparation,2 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 113, 119-21 (1972).
115 ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY,

STATE,

AND UTOPIA 230-31

(1974)

(arguing that

rectifying past injustices is best done by organizing society so as to maximize the position of
the lowest class).
156 Thompson, supra note 153, at 121 (censuring Nozick's suggestions of organizing
society to provide benefits to the least well-off for undermining reparations claims).
157 Ryan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, 213 (1866)
158As an empirical matter, the assumption that the effects have worn off after one
generation appears to be consistent with the results of the Sacerdote study, provided the
comparison is limited to income and literacy. See SACERDOTE, supra note 103, at 15-17.
However, Sacerdote finds that the likelihood of being in a female-headed household remains
significantly higher for slave descendants even into the second generation (that of
grandchildren). Id. at 18 (finding that grandchildren of slaves are 6.5% more likely to live
in a female-headed household than grandchildren of free blacks). Thus, the empirical
evidence suggests that the family instability effects of slavery were passed on to at least two
successive generations.
"I See Complaint, supra note 1, at 17; Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 60-61.
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There is always a question in torts whether to treat a claim for restitution as
merely a remedial measure or as a completely different theory supporting the
plaintiff s claim. 160 Viewed purely as a remedial measure, we would treat the
prior proof requisites of duty, breach, and causation as unaffected by the
plaintiffs claim for restitution, and merely insert a claim for restitution once
we reached the last stage of the plaintiffs case, the proof of damages. In
contrast, viewed as an alternative tort theory, we would take a different
approach to the questions of duty and breach if we know that the plaintiff
intends to seek restitution.
I think the better approach is to treat the restitution claim as an alternative
tort theory. Restitutionary gain-eliminating penalties should be applied to a
special class of torts.' 61 One is the case in which the injurer has acted with the
type of "specific intent" that the criminal law looks for. For example, suppose
62
the injurer intentionally bums down the plaintiff s house. Following Posner,1
I will label this type of conduct as "market bypassing." All injuries involving
expropriatory conduct, where the injurer takes or destroys something that could
have been transferred to him through a consensual transaction, fall into this
category. 163 The other case is that in which the injurer's conduct is always
socially undesirable, under any set of circumstances. Unambiguously-sociallyundesirable conduct is of the type in which the gain to the actor (or anyone
else) is far less than the expected harm resulting from the conduct. For
example, consider an injurer that drives recklessly through a crowded area.
160

Most scholars have framed the question as whether restitution is appropriate for all

tort claims or for some special set of claims. See, e.g., Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of
Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong,
80 COLUM. L. REv. 504, 506-510 (1980) (arguing that an independent restitution claim
should be available whenever one person benefits from the appropriation of property or
quasi-property interest of another).
See generally PROSSER, supra note 34, § 94
(commenting that the tortfeasor must have benefited from his tortuous act in order for
plaintiffs claim to be a claim for restitution independent from the normal tort claim).
161On the role of gain-eliminating penalties, see Brief of Keith N. Hylton as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (No. 01-1289), arguing that under gain stripping theory,
there is no concern for over-deterrence because the goal is to completely deter harmful
conduct, rather than deter harmful conduct to an optimal level. See also Keith N. Hylton,
Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 467 (1998)
(arguing that punitive damages should completely eliminate any benefit a tortfeasor may
gain from his tort, thus completely deterring the offensive conduct).
162 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
1193, 1195-96 (1985) (asserting that the purpose of the criminal law is primarily economic
in that it prevents people from by-passing the system of voluntary, compensated exchange).
163The key to "market bypassing" under this theory, is not that the injurer has
expropriated some recognized property right, as suggested by FRIEDMANN, supra note 160,
at 510-13. The property-based approach to restitution generates confusion. The key to the
market-bypassing approach is that it looks for forced transfers that occur in a setting in
which a consensual transfer could have been arranged easily.
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The reason restitutionary gain-eliminating damage awards are appropriate in
the two general cases just identified - market bypassing and unambiguouslysocially-undesirable conduct - is that the goal of a damage award in these
settings is to completely deter the injurer's conduct. In other words, restitution
damages differ from compensatory damages in the sense that the latter aim
merely to internalize the victim's loss while the former aim to put an end to the
injurer's conduct. Restitution damages are appropriate when applied to market
bypassing and unambiguously-socially-undesirable conduct because both types
have no social benefit of any sort. 164 The socially optimal level of market
bypassing conduct, such as theft, is zero. On the other hand, compensatory
damages are typically appropriate when the underlying conduct offers some
social benefit. For example, the activity of running a railroad is clearly
beneficial to society. Damages for the negligent operation of a railroad should
therefore be limited to the compensatory level.
To complete this thumbnail sketch of the theory of damages, I should
describe the role played by compensation. Nothing I have said so far provides
a reason for giving the damage award to the victim rather than the state. This
is an especially important question in the case of restitution because one could
make a plausible argument that the state rather than the victim should receive
an award designed primarily to punish.
One could defend awarding

'64

I find this theory of restitution far simpler than that alternatives based on notions of

protecting autonomy. See HANOCH DAGAN, THE FOURTH PILLAR: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF

RESTITUTION 256-57 (forthcoming August 2004) (arguing that damage awards respond to
the defendant's wrongful conduct by vindicating a plaintiff's dignity and self-worth);
Dagan, supra note 42, at 1148 (stating that restitutionary recovery protects personal
autonomy by protecting one's ability to be the ultimate decisionmaker with respect to the
use of labor). While I find Dagan's theory intuitively appealing, I think it is far simpler to
say that restitution aims to eliminate the wrongdoer's gain in the two general cases of
market-bypassing and always-socially-undesirable conduct. For criticism of Dagan's view
of restitution, largely on the ground that restitutionary damages commodify slave labor, see
Anthony Sebok, Two Concepts of Injustice in Restitutionfor Slavery, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1405,
1432-33 (2004). To some extent, the commodification critique is consistent with my claim
that the tort system is simply inadequate to compensate for many of the harms of slavery,
such as the slave marriage. However, this is a problem with monetary damages as a general
matter. Moreover, given that the theory of a restititionary award in the case of slavery
would be the same as that for conversion (i.e., defendant stole plaintiffs X, where X is labor
or property) I fail to see why the commodification critique is more worrisome in the slavery
reparations case than in any other context involving intentional torts. An alternative
argument against restitution, offered by Emily Sherwin, is that restitution draws on notions
of vengeance or retaliation, which are inappropriate grounds for consideration of publicly
controversial issues. See Emily Sherwin, Reparations and Unjust Enrichment, 84 B.U. L.
Rev. 1443, 1456-60 (2004) (arguing that by focusing on stripping the defendant of any gains
from his wrongful conduct, restitution introduces a vengeance-like aspect to private
litigation). However, much of the criminal law draws on notions of vengeance, see
HOLMES, supra note 16, at 2-34, and still we do not allow that concern to constrain its scope
of application.
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restitutionary damages to victims on the ground that victims have the greatest
incentive to sue, or to act as private attorneys general. However, the reason
that seems to fit best with history is the notion that awarding damages to
victims buys public peace. 165 If victims are not compensated, they will have
incentives to seek revenge or to retaliate in some way against the injurer.
Under this theory of damages, slavery would appear to be appropriate for a
restitution-based damage claim because the slaveholder has stolen the labor of
his victim, a classic case of bypassing the market. The fact that slavery was
lawful at the time it occurred should not be an obstacle under the theory
developed here. As I said before, arguments against legal revisionism or
retroactive application of the law should be dismissed in the special case of
slavery. The slaveholder sought a regime in which the law simply did not
apply to his relationship with the slave. Since the institution operated under
the slaveholder's law rather than the law of the state, the state has no obligation
to respect rights allocated according to the slaveholder's law. The state has no
more of an obligation to respect the slaveholder's law than it has to respect that
of a warlord.
As a positive matter, however, the restitution claim, like that for
compensatory damages, runs into the problem created by the passage of time.
To be sure, the passage-of-time argument is different in this case, and arguably
allows more room for the reparations plaintiffs to be compensated. In the
compensatory damages case that we considered earlier, the passage-of-time
argument severely weakened the causation part of the plaintiffs claim, because
there were so many ways that the slave's surplus labor could have been
squandered or diverted to other uses over four, five, or six generations. In the
restitution-based damages case, we are not concerned so much with causation
as with the dilution of the signal that a restitution award is designed to send. If
the purpose of the award is to say to the injurers, "you will never gain a penny
from this conduct," then we have no reason to believe that this message is
communicated by a penalty that falls four or five generations after the initial
166
wrong.
165See HOLMES, supra note 16, at 2-34 (arguing that vengeance is the basis of law and

tracing historical development of criminal and tort law); SMITH, supra note 15, at 106-10
(tracing development of criminal law from a system based on compensation of victims).
166 For a general discussion of the prescription of rights that is consistent with this
position, see SMITH, supra note 15, at 135-38, claiming that a right to a grievance against an
injurer may expire after a reasonable amount of time. For a brief statement of a roughly
similar point made in the context of reparations claims, see Levmore, supra note 5, at 1687,
asserting that the paying of reparations is so unpredictable and slow that they do not
influence the likelihood of substantive change in how society will treat the injured group.
More recent economic justifications of the prescription of rights have focused on the
balance between the benefit from deterrence and the cost of litigation (or of law
enforcement). See Yair Listoken, Efficient Time Bars:A New Rationalefor the Existence of
Statutes of Limitations in CriminalLaw, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 114-15 (2002) (stating that
as time passes, the deterrence benefit falls, while the enforcement cost remains fixed or
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Though far from an easy victory, it should be clear that reparations plaintiffs
have a stronger argument under the restitution theory than under the
compensatory damages claim. If, one might argue, courts awarded restitution
damages four or five generations after the initial wrong, then potential injurers
might realize that any harm they inflict today will revisit their children or
grandchildren in the form of a claim for damages, and this could deter them
from committing the initial wrong. This is a plausible argument, and one could
not accuse a court of having misunderstood restitution doctrine if on the basis
of this argument it awarded restitution damages for slavery. As a practical
matter, however, it seems unlikely that a gain-eliminating judgment imposed
four or five generations after the initial harm could have a significant deterrent
effect. Looking forward, the slaveholder may think that his genetic connection
to his great-great grandchildren is just too remote for him to worry about their
welfare. Similarly, the plaintiffs, descendants of victims, may have such a
remote connection to the initial victims that one cannot plausibly believe that
awarding them compensation protects the public order or peace.
No American court, in recent years, has awarded a judgment for a plaintiff
on a damages claim for slavery, either for compensatory or restitution-based
damages. 167 The FleetBoston complaint, after consolidation with other cases,
produced a long opinion dismissing it on several grounds, 168 though the
amended version of that complaint is still alive. Any court handing down a
decision in a modem reparations case would, however, probably remain in line
with existing tort doctrine, and hold that far too much time has passed and too
many actions have intervened for the plaintiffs to establish a satisfactory causal
connection between their injuries and the wrongs committed by the
predecessors of the defendant corporations. To be sure, the court may not use
the language of proximate cause. It may instead refer to a statute of
limitations, or, as the court in Moch, to the defendant's zone of duty under tort
law.' 69 All of these arguments are reducible to the core passage-of-time
problem that severely weakens the legal basis for compensating reparations
plaintiffs. 170 When compared to the precedent of sorts set by the Holocaust
increases, making it efficient to bar criminal prosecutions after some cut-off date); Thomas
J. Miceli, Deterrence, Litigation Costs, and the Statute of Limitations for Torts Suits, 20
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 383, 393 (2000) (arguing that as time passes, the deterrence benefit
falls as litigation costs increase, making it efficient to bar litigation after some cut-off date).
167 Of course, there were several cases in which damages were awarded to former slaves
during the nineteenth century. See Kull, supra note 8, at 1286-88 (discussing how former
slaves successfully sued their former masters for wrongful detainment).
168In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d (ND. I11. 2004). For a
critique of the opinion, see Epstein, supra note 10, at 1178-92. Epstein criticizes the
majority for dismissing the claims for lack of standing and for violating the political
question doctrine, when the sole grounds for dismissal should have been the statute of
limitations defense. Id.
169 See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898 (N.Y. 1928).
170 My position is consistent with that of Epstein, supra note 10, at 1178-92. Although
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settlements, this may appear to be an arbitrary conclusion. However, that is
always true to some extent of proximate cause holdings. A line has to be
drawn somewhere.
C.

The Normative Question

The question of the moment is whether, as a normative matter, a decision
against reparations plaintiffs based on some version of the passage-of-time
criticism is a desirable outcome. Put more generally, is the passage-of-time
argument always a defensible ground for rejecting a claim for compensation or
restitution? As a general matter, the answer is clearly yes. Expectations have
to be settled at some point. From a traditional tort theory perspective, passage
of time and intervening actions mean that the deterrent signal connected to any
compensation award is weakened beyond usefulness. In addition, as time
passes, the degree of resentment that might threaten public order if plaintiffs
are not compensated becomes unlikely to ever materialize. All that remains in
terms of the social utility of a damages award is the ability to redistribute
wealth from the lucky toward the unlucky. But redistribution is not a good use
of the tort system. 71 From a restitution theory perspective, the same
arguments apply, though with slight variations. The full deterrent effect of a
gain-eliminating judgment is less likely to be observed as we expand the time
periods between the commission of the wrong and the judgment. And, as is
true in the case of the claim for compensatory damages, the need to avoid
retaliation based on resentment falls substantially as time passes.
All I have said so far is that courts have to draw a line at some point,
extinguishing tort claims that are too old and distant in terms of intervening
events. What about the claims brought by reparations plaintiffs? Are they in
the "too old and distant" category? Suppose they are not. Then determining
when a claim becomes too old and distant to be a viable one for damages is
very difficult. If a period of four generations is not too long, then why should
we consider six generations too long? Once this question is seriously thrown
into play in courts, many property rights and legal entitlements start to look
less predictable. Since much of the law, and especially property law, seeks to
settle expectations, this is a position it should avoid.
Epstein agrees with the final outcome (dismissal) in African-American Slave Descendants
Litigation, he shows that many of the arguments used in that opinion were invalid. Id. The
causation and prescription arguments were perhaps the only valid arguments of that opinion.
171 For the classic argument against using the tort system primarily as a means of
compensating rather than deterring injuries, see HOLMES, supra note 16, at 96. Holmes
notes that the private insurance market is a far more efficient system of compensation. Id.
See also, Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 1717, 1719-20 (1982) (arguing that the structural limits of a case and the common law
make redistributing wealth for one section of society to another very difficult, if at all
possible); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667-68 (1994) (claiming that
using an inefficient legal rule will only increase administrative costs).
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One might say that this is inconsistent with my earlier argument that the
slaveholder should not be allowed to defend himself on the ground that slavery
was legal when it occurred. To say that reparations plaintiffs must lose their
case because of the passage of time seems to reassert the slaveholder's defense
in a different guise. But there is a difference between the two defenses, the one
based on legality and the other based on the passage of time. Moreover, the
reason for rejecting the legality argument and accepting the passage of time
argument is, at its core, the same. The legality argument is rejected because it
is an assertion that the warlord's law (or non-law) is superior to the law, which
should never be the case. The passage of time defense says that rights become
too fuzzy and unpredictable to be useful if we allow the plaintiff to prevail.
Put another way, the law is at risk of losing its predictability, and hence much
of its utility as law, if we allow claims that are extremely old and distant. Both
arguments drive toward the same conclusion: That we reject the legality
defense and accept the passage of time defense in order to preserve and protect
the social utility of the law.
I hope I have been clear in my view that morality does not justify the
rejection of the reparations claim. In particular, the new consensus among
17 2
moral theorists that supports such a rejection, as Waldron clearly sets out,
appears deeply flawed upon close examination. The new consensus argument,
which holds that tort claims based on slavery are morally undeserving of
compensation because they are too old and distant, 173 is quite consistent with
tort doctrine. But the law reaches this position, not for moral reasons, but to
preserve its own social utility. Moral arguments should have a different flavor
and should involve at least some norms that are not diminished by the mere
passage of time or by every change of circumstances. Otherwise, corrective
justice theory becomes a version of economics - practiced without the
constraint of mathematical modeling.
Waldron argues that reparative claims must be cut off after a lot of time has
passed because people plan their lives around their possessions. 174 The
descendants of the initial expropriators have planned their lives around the
expropriated property that they inherited. The descendants of the initial
victims of expropriation have also planned their lives around the absence of the
expropriated property. If the moral basis for recognizing property rights is to
permit individuals to plan and create their own lives - to exercise autonomy then it should follow that there is a moral basis for refusing to redistribute
entitlements after a lot of time has passed.
While it is certainly true that people plan their lives around their
possessions, this does not create a moral basis for denying reparative justice
172 See Waldron, supra note 152, at 26 (concluding that "any conception ofjustice which
is to be made practically relevant for the way we act now must be a scheme which takes into
account modem circumstances").
173See, e.g., id.

174 Id. at 16-20.
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claims. To be sure, it creates a utilitarian or economic basis for denying such
claims, but the moral basis for the reparative claim would seem to be constant.
This is probably the reason Nozick refused to get into the business of
distinguishing between generations whose claims to reparative justice were
morally sounad and those whose claims were not. 175 Once you start drawing
these lines, you start sliding fast down a slope that ends in utilitarianism.
Moral arguments cannot be used persuasively to reject claims for reparative
justice brought by descendants of slaves. The torts of American slavery,
especially the social torts, inflicted serious injuries, some with the capacity to
return and injure successive generations. Slavery launched racism as a belief
structure designed to maintain an inefficient social order, which remains a
force today. It seems fairly easy on moral grounds to say that its beneficiaries
should pay up. 176 Kant, who went further than anyone else in an attempt to
create a logically consistent set of moral laws, said the following about just
deserts:
What kind and what degree of punishment does public legal justice adopt
as its principle and standard? None other than the principle of equality
(illustrated by the pointer on the scales of justice), that is, the principle of
not treating one side more favorably than the other. Accordingly, any
undeserved evil that you inflict on someone else among the people is one
that you do to yourself. If you vilify him, you vilify yourself; if you steal
from him, you steal from yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself....
If, however, he has committed a murder, he must die. In this case, there
is no substitute that will satisfy the requirements of legal justice. There is
no sameness of kind between death and remaining alive even under the
most miserable conditions, and consequently there is also no equality
between the crime and the retribution unless the criminal is judicially
condemned and put to death.... Even if a civil society were to dissolve
itself by common agreement of all its members (for example, if the
people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse themselves
around the world), the last murderer remaining in prison must first be
executed, so that everyone will duly receive what his actions are worth

' Nozick's discussion of the principle of rectification (or, in the terms used in this
paper, reparative justice) doesn't go much beyond stating general principles. See NoziCK,
supra note 155, at 152-53, 230-31. Nozick's principles, however, suggest that reparative
rights are constant. See id.
176 See Boxill, supra note 154, at 119-21 (arguing that the present day white community
owes descendants of slaves reparations, regardless of whether they are blameworthy,
because they have a moral duty to correct past wrongs). For a review and critique of the
moral arguments for slavery-based reparations, see generally David Lyons, Corrective
Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Legacy of Slavery and Jim Crow, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1375
(2004).
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and so that the bloodguilt thereof will not be fixed on the people because
they failed to insist on carrying out the punishment; for if they fail to do
so, they may be regarded as accomplices in this public violation of legal
177
justice.
Kant's emphasis on equality suggests that restitution is required of the
slaveholders.
His emphasis on society's need to purge itself of the
"bloodguilt" from a crime would suggests a continuing responsibility on the
part of successive generations to restore equality in order to avoid being
accomplices in the initial violation of justice.
In any event, I do not regard the moral arguments as leaving room for only
one position on the reparations claims. Neither are utilitarian arguments,
generally, capable of delivering a clear answer on the reparations issue. The
only argument capable of yielding an answer is a utilitarian argument of a
particular type - specifically that reparations claims by descendants of slaves
are viable tort claims only to the extent they are consistent with tort law's
regulatory function.

III. THE ACCOUNTING CLAIM
The FleetBoston reparations complaint included a demand for an accounting
of the ways in which the predecessors of the defendant corporations profited
from slavery. 178 This is an unusual claim, one that hardly ever arises in tort
actions. An accounting would ordinarily fall out of a tort suit as the defendant
offers justifications or excuses for his conduct. The plaintiff, for his part,
would offer theories of the defendant's conduct in the course of the suit. The
result of a trial is an official account of the defendant's conduct resulting either
in a damage award for the plaintiff or a victory for the defendant. The fact that
the reparations plaintiffs included a separate demand for an accounting
suggests that there is something special about this part of the lawsuit.
There are reasons to think that the accounting demand is especially
important in a reparations suit and that it may be the one part of the plaintiff's
claim that offers the potential for social gain. Slavery, quite plausibly, has had
a ripple effect lasting through several generations. The need to threaten slaves
with force and to maintain a social hierarchy that kept them at the bottom
produced a sturdy brand of racism that embedded itself in the social
institutions that maintained that order - police, courts, schools, and some
private corporations. Most of us have no way of knowing how serious this
racism was, how frequently it appeared in practice, and the extent to which it
affects decisions people make today. Indeed, the fact that the reparations
plaintiffs have had to ask for the accounting, and that it is not already a matter
of public record, suggests that the defendants may have in their hands private
177 IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE METAPHYSICS

OF MORALS 138-40 (John Ladd trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 2d ed. 1999) (1797).
178 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 15 (demanding defendants to account for any profits
they made from slavery).
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records that could prove embarrassing or shameful, and at the least could shed
new light on past events.
Why dig up potentially embarrassing records from the past? Doesn't
everyone have something they would like to hide from the public? Probably
so, but this is a different case from that of exposing personal records on an
individual, like tax or medical records. Corporations and government entities
should be required to make public records that reveal the profits or gains they
or their predecessors made from slavery and from the oppressive regimes that
appeared in its wake. This would include not only the slavery-related profit
records demanded by reparations plaintiffs. It would also require disclosing
information on how firms profited from the violence against African
Americans during and after slavery. For example, a railroad that scheduled
extra service so that the local public could attend a lynching should be required
to reveal these records of its history. 179 It should also require revealing
blatantly discriminatory policies adopted in the recent past.
Making this information public would benefit historians, which might be a
sufficient reason, but not the most important reason. More importantly, this
information can lay the foundation for a more productive exchange on racial
issues in the public square and minimize the likelihood of discrimination in the
present. As long as successors of firms that profited from slavery and
descendants of slaveholders approach the public square with white-washed
histories, claiming to know nothing of the past other than pleasantries, there
will be a considerable degree of dishonesty with a concomitant level of distrust
in public discussions of racial issues. And as long as corporations or other
entities are sitting on top of private information that shows participation in
racial oppression or discrimination in the past, we will have to wonder about
their incentives not to discriminate in the present.
Jeremy Waldron's discussion of historic injustices suggests that the benefits
of an accounting could be deeper and broader than I have suggested. He
claims that getting the truth out on the table sustains "the moral and cultural
reality of self and community." 180 On a more prosaic level, getting the truth
about historic injustices on the table counteracts the propagation of racist, or
more generally, "essentialist" beliefs. 181 For as Waldron notes, letting bygones
be bygones opens an informational vacuum which is soon filled by self-serving
tales of moral desert by the victors. 182 It appears to be human nature to
attribute success and failure to some supposedly essential characteristic -

' See DRAY, supra note 13 1, at 12-13 (describing the scheduling of extra train service

to accommodate lynching spectators).
180 See Waldron, supra note 152, at 6.
8I mean essentialist in the sense used by POPPER, supra note 25, at 14, which is the
view that history can be explained by essential traits or features of its participants (or of a
system or institution) that allow us to predict the course of events.
182 See Waldron, supra note 152, at 6.
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perhaps race, or character, or to an illusive general intelligence factor. 183 The
more complicated history has to continually be brought into plain view in order
to prevent some version of the essentialist story from taking precedence. This
is a worthwhile goal because essentialist stories tend to encourage both the
imposition by history's victors and acceptance by history's victims of new
injustices.
These potential benefits are not present in every case in which a firm's
predecessor participated in or profited from slavery or some other oppressive
regime. In some cases, knowing whether a firm's predecessor profited from
slavery tells us very little. Take the case of an insurance company that profited
from insuring slaves. Did this insurance firm's actions make slavery a more
oppressive regime? Not necessarily. The firm's activity in the insurance
market may have made slavery a less oppressive regime. Property insurers
charge deductibles and sometimes offer prices that encourage the insured to
reduce the risk of losing property (e.g., discounts for installing burglar alarms
in homes). There is no reason to believe a priori that an insurer that profited
from slavery made the regime more oppressive. The historical evidence may
be able to tell us whether the insurer's participation made the regime more or
less oppressive.
Suppose, instead, the insurance firm adopted a discriminatory policy of
refusing to offer insurance of any type to blacks. The firm's reason could be
based on some version of the statistical discrimination theory or some more
invidious type of discrimination. This history should be a part of the public
record. If it is not, and the firm desires to keep it buried in its records, then the
firm will have an incentive to refuse to hire or promote black employees.
Having potentially embarrassing information or secrets of this sort sitting in
business files promotes a culture in which the fact of oppression or
discrimination in the past becomes a motivation for discrimination in the
present. Putting this information into the public light removes this incentive to
discriminate.
Now consider a different example: a politician who has inherited his money
from slaveholding ancestors runs for governor. When asked where the money
came from, he tells the public that he was a success in business - say, a venture
capitalist. Should the fact that the politician's wealth has largely been handed
down by slaveholders be a matter of public concern? I think so. That the
politician wants to hide this fact from the public is itself a concern because it
suggests he is unwilling to publicly confront the issues that it would naturally
generate if made public.

183 RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND

CLASS STRUCTURE INAMERICAN LIFE 51-61 (1994) (stating that people with higher IQs and

more education have higher paying jobs). For a critique of Hermstein and Murray, see
James J. Heckman, Lessons from the Bell Curve, 103 J. POL. ECON. 1091, 1102-03 (1995),
which argues that Herrnstein and Murray's conclusion is weak because a single factor, such
as IQ, can always be constructed so that it correlates to success in the employment sector.
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Unlike the demand for damages, the accounting demand does not seem to
pose any potential dangers for the legal system, or any particularly large social
costs. They do not seem, as some have feared, to exacerbate racism by forcing
unsuspecting white defendants to pay damages to a large, indefinite class of
black plaintiffs. 184 They do not appear to offer a cheap apology, allowing
potential defendants to wash their hands of the matter and to say that
discrimination has, for once and for all, been paid for. 185 On the other hand,
they do have the capacity to lessen discrimination's regenerative capacity, and
to give society a clearer view on the social costs of racism.
It should be clear that a parallel can be drawn to the case of families and
firms that hold information on ancestors or predecessor firms that participated
in the Holocaust. This information should be made public for reasons roughly
similar to those set out for the slavery case. If anything, the argument for
disclosure is considerably stronger because the injuries were inflicted more
recently. Indeed, rather than having lawsuits dig out this information, the
better approach is to pass a law requiring firms and families to divulge
information on participation in slavery or the Holocaust. There is no need to
establish a penalty, such as a fine or jail term, for failing to divulge the
information. Failure to disclose this information should become, over time, a
black mark unto itself because it indicates that the holder of the information
preferred to stay silent rather than disclose it. By staying silent rather than
disclosing, the holder of the information is avoiding a public confrontation
with the issues generated by the slavery and Holocaust lawsuits, and helping,
albeit in a small way, to preserve a public state of detachment and denial that
makes oppressive and discriminatory regimes possible.
CONCLUSION

The FleetBoston reparations complaint, with its light treatment of statistics
and citations to articles from USA Today, appears to have taken the text of a
talk given to student groups on college campuses and put it into the courtroom.
Perhaps the plaintiffs will rely on more rigorous statistical evidence to make
their case as the litigation progresses, but the start was far from promising in
this respect. A serious case for slavery reparations, if possible, will have to be

184See, e.g., Yamamoto, Racial Reparations,supra note 5, at 512 (arguing that racial
backlash from reparations would only come from those in the majority whose ancestors did
not own slaves). Thus, the fact that an accounting demands proof of records about what
economic advantage was gained, a claim for accounting would not harm white Americans
whose families immigrated to America after the fall of slavery.
185See Magee, supra note 5, at 880-81 (explaining that even after reparations are paid,
the continuation of race-based affirmative action will be necessary to combat persisting
racial bias in America); Glenn C. Loury, It's Futile to Put a Price on Slavery, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 2000, at A 15 (concluding that reparations can never truly make up for the damage
that was inflicted on African Americans by slavery).
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built on statistical analysis rather than on emotional appeals. 186 When
someone, maybe a later set of plaintiffs, finally gets around to doing this, they
will have a particularly hard time dealing with the passage of time and
intervention issues that have to be satisfied by any tort claim

186 The general "game plan" for a reparations lawsuit, if it is to be successful, was
suggested by Nozick's brief discussion of the implementation of the rectification principle.
[L]et us suppose theoretical investigation will produce a principle of rectification. This
principle uses historical information about previous situations and injustices done in
them... and information about the actual course of events that flowed from these
injustices, until the present, and it yields a description (or descriptions) of holdings in
the society. The principle of rectification presumably will make use of its best estimate
of subjunctive information about what would have occurred (or a probability
distribution over what might have occurred, using the expected value) if the injustice
had not taken place. If the actual description of holdings turns out not to be one of the
descriptions yielded by the principle, then one of the descriptions yielded must be
realized.
NOZICK, supra note 155, at 152-53.
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